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ABSTRACT
This is a thesis that relies upon oral history to investigate the experiences of
Australian soldiers serving in Vietnam in 1967. The thesis is unusual because the
historian is the former platoon commander of these soldiers who recorded the
narrations of former platoon members. The first half of the thesis examines the
strengths and weaknesses of oral history and why the Vietnam War has produced so
many controversial 'narrations' from veterans of the war. The second half of the
thesis examines a controversy that affected this platoon and involved the killing of
civilians in an ambush on 23 October 1967. The ambush became a major controversy
in the Australian press in 1976. The conclusion reached is that oral history, especially
the narrations of ordinary soldiers, is vital for an improved understanding of the
Vietnam War but these narrations must be used carefully and corroborated as much
as possible with written sources. In the case of the ambush that is at the centre of this
thesis, it is only through the narrations of the soldiers that it is possible to understand
an event that became embroiled in political controversy and patriotic propaganda.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the issue of how we can best use soldiers’ oral histories to improve
our understanding of the Vietnam War. These questions are asked in the context of my own tour
of duty in Vietnam.

I served as Platoon Commander (2 Platoon, Alpha Company, Second

Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment [2RAR]) leading a group of thirty-three men in Vietnam in
1967. Forty years later, I decided to reinvent myself as an historian who would specialise in
oral history.

One of my concerns, and perhaps the central issue, is the value of soldiers’

testimonies in recording the history of the war.

An important secondary question is what is

the usefulness of a former commander conducting interviews with veterans of his own military
unit? Does the participant interviewer add to or subtract from the value of oral history?

The initial impetus for this research was a phone-call from a platoon member who complained
that a popular history of the Vietnam War had wrongly described the injuries sustained by a
1

member of the platoon.

My first step was to check if the Official History series had reported

the incident correctly or not. The error reported by my telephone informant had indeed found its
2

way into the Official History series.

In the overall history of the Vietnam War, the mistake was not important, although it was, and
remains, important to the soldiers who had to attend to their comrade’s wounds.

Many medical

professionals will confirm that traumatic memories will eventually bring many veterans into their
3

care.

It raises the issue, however, of how factual errors become part of what is recorded as

‘history’.
An obsession with ‘facts’ is not simply an academic matter for many veterans.

A popular

topic among surviving members of the platoon is that some have failed to obtain compensation for
battlefield injuries, while others were successful citing the same service. These disputes over
pensions and financial compensation have lasted for decades and caused enormous suspicion
among veterans about the purpose of ‘official history’. For some, there is hope that a more

1. Telephone conversation, Paul King/Ben Morris, 12 December 2007. The book in question was Paul Ham, Vietnam: The Australian
War, HarperCollins, Pymble, 2007, 338.
2. Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive, The Official History of Australia’s Involvement in South-East Asia, Allen and Unwin,
Crows Nest, 2003, 264.
3. A. C. McFarlane, S. E. Hodson, M. Van Hooff and C. Davies, Mental Health in the Australian Defence Force: 2010 ADF Mental
Health and Wellbeing Study: Full report, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2011. “Post-traumatic stress disorder was the most
prevalent anxiety disorder, with highest rates among ADF males”.
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detailed and accurate account of our platoon activities would strengthen their case in negotiations
with the Department of Veterans Affairs.

At another level, members of the platoon felt that their story had never been told. The Official
4

History records 2 Platoon’s service within the theatre of war in 134 words.

Yet one incident in

which the platoon was involved does not appear in the Official History or the battalion history, but
is mentioned in three books, and, for a few weeks in 1976, reopened the deep divisions within
5

Australia over the moral dimension of the Vietnam War.

This incident involved the shooting of
6

civilians in an ambush that took place in October 1967.
7

that a war crime had been committed.

Some of the commentary suggested

Terry Burstall described it as the ‘worst’ incident of

8

its kind committed by Australian troops.
It seemed to me wrong that this terrible event in which I was directly involved was never properly
investigated. Its ‘history’ was used and abused for political purposes. The soldiers themselves
were mostly left without a voice. This ambush that resulted in civilian casualties is the central
example that I will use to show that oral history is a necessary addition to our sources of
information given that the written sources are often unreliable, contradictory, or insufficient.
In doing my research, it became clear that what counts as ‘history’ is rarely clear-cut. Historians
are interested in broad trends and interpretations. Yet at the same time, this birds-eye view of
the war depends upon accurate knowledge of what happened on the ground.

The project

received encouragement from Michael Tyquin, who was commissioned by the Army to write
9

the history of the first hundred years of the Royal Australian Medical Corps.

Tyquin

has shown how retired generals, politicians, and the media have often distorted the 'official
history' of Australia’s’ wars.

10

As a result, the public is left with an airbrushed, distorted and

11

more patriotic history.

12

Some military historians interview only generals.

As Alessandro

4. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, 264.
5. Terry Burstall, Vietnam:, The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, 102. Terry Burstall, A Soldier
Returns, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1990, 180. Kenneth Maddock, ‘Going over the Limit?’ in Kenneth Maddock (ed.),
Memories of Vietnam, Random House, Milsons Point, 1991, 151-4. Tim Colebatch and Prue Innes, ‘Australians Massacred 27 Viets’,
The Age, 2 August 1976.
6. Lieutenant E B Morris, After Action Report, 2 RAR Commander’s Diary, 24 October 1967.
7. Burstall, A Soldier Returns, 150-84. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 96-106.
8. Burstall, A Soldier Returns, 180. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 102
9. Michael Tyquin, Little by Little, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2007.
10. Tyquin, Madness and the Military, 15-17.
11. Tyquin, Madness in the Military, 15.
12. Donald A Ritchie, Doing Oral History, A Practical Guide, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 24. Allessandro Portelli, The
Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991,
ix. Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory, Routledge, London, 2010, 161.
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Portelli has put it, they conduct elite interviews.

Much of what is described as ‘military

history’ concerns the deeds of commanders and politicians, while much less is known about
the men and women in the military units that did the actual fighting.

The obvious method for my research was oral history. I had access to an untapped resource,
the surviving soldiers of my platoon.

As one researcher has put it, ‘oral history may be

defined as in depth biography interviewing, typically of people who are excluded from or
14

marginalised within conventional historical accounts’. ‘Marginalised’ appeared to me to be
a good description of our platoon’s part in the Vietnam War. I began to take oral histories
from members of my platoon in 2004, with the aim of giving a voice to the frontline soldier. I
soon became aware of some of the difficulties in writing ‘history’. It is possible that our picture
of the Vietnam War is either too rosy or too cynical, depending upon the preferences of the
historian. Professional historians point out that an advantage of oral history is that it helps to
understand attitudes, feelings and emotions that have developed since the events in question;
however memory is often looked upon as an unreliable guide to the events that occurred decades
15

earlier.

For many decades, oral history gave rise to debate among historians, many of whom
16

are wary of it, preferring the primacy of archival research and documentary sources.

Jane

Ross, who interviewed Australian troops in Vietnam in 1971, put it this way:

But how do you categorise remembrance of things past?

An eyewitness

`description is primary. But the memory of this witness, years later, when it is
not something “known” so much as something remembered as having once
been “known” is something far less reliable.

17

Despite the increasing quantity, as well as the quality, of oral history over the last three decades,
there are still many who doubt the value of asking ordinary soldiers to recall their battlefield
experiences decades later. In some ways, those sceptical of oral history are similar to some

13. Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, viii.
14. Mahuna Sarkar, Journal of Historical Sociology, 25, 4, Dec 2012.
15. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 12, 212. Alistair Thomson, ANZAC Memories Living with the Legend, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1994, 225, 235, 239, Alistair Thomson ‘Anzac Memories’ in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second
Edition, Routledge, Oxford, 2006, 245. Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle, Vietnam, War, Myth and Memory: Comparative Perspectives on
Australia's War in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1992, 149. Allessandro Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out,
Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, 2003, 18, 19. Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, Oral History and the Art of Dialogue,
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison Wisconsin, 1997, 190. Abrams, Oral History Theory, 156.
16. Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, x. Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Donald
A. Ritchie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Oral History, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 79, 80.
17. Jane Ross, ‘A Holiday at the War’, in Maddock, Memories of Vietnam, 215.
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senior army officers who are dubious of the other ranks’ narratives and offered little
encouragement to my research. The theme is that veterans’ memories would be embellished and
that there would be great difference between eyewitness accounts. To ask those soldiers to
describe the same event forty years down the track would, according to this view, lead to
18

greater discrepancies, myth making and falsehoods.

This type of scepticism helps explain why very few officers have invited oral histories
from the soldiers in the lower ranks of their own units.

Gerard Windsor has described as

‘soldierology’ the myths that soldiers create when narrating their battlefield experiences.

19

Windsor is especially sceptical about the recollections of the lower-ranked soldiers who tend to
‘flower-up their yarns’. He has little faith in soldiers’ ‘remembered history’.

20

Windsor has

noted that when soldiers interview soldiers, there is a temptation to reconstruct a shared past that,
consciously or unconsciously, may portray events in a light that flatters them and satisfies the
21

expectation of their audience.

Paul Ham has noted that many senior officers and public

servants believe that veterans have used their ‘alleged’ memories to help themselves to
22

entitlements they should not receive.

It is safe to conclude that there is continuing scepticism

about the veracity of the oral histories produced by Vietnam veterans even though oral history is
23

becoming more and more prominent.

On the other hand, it has to be admitted that soldiers’ testimony often is problematic. My efforts
to investigate the past were at least in part inspired by the widespread scepticism among
24

veterans about the oral testimony of other veterans.

There has probably been no war in history

that has had so many ‘eye-witness’ accounts published as the Vietnam War and where the
accounts of eyewitnesses have been so disputed. I had to acknowledge that veterans, like myself,
are often astonished at the improbable stories recounted in the literature about the Vietnam
War, where the sources quoted were veterans of the war.

There is no doubting the popularity of the books that romanticise and sanitise the history

18. Email, Kevin Grayson to E B Morris, Where do we get a mention, 6 Feb, 2010.
19. Gerard Windsor, All Day Long, the Noise of Battle, Murdoch Books, Millers Point, 2011, 14.
20. Greg Lockhart, ‘Two Insightful Books on the Vietnam War’, The Vietnam Veterans Peacekeepers and Peacemakers Journal,
December, 2011, 14.
21. Windsor, All Day Long, 22.
22. Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, 635.
23. Windsor, All Day Long, 22. Email, John Essex-Clark to Ben Morris, Subject: Military madness of diggers lost in legend, 4 June
2006. Kevin Grayson to Ben Morris, Where do we get a mention.
24. Windsor, All Day Long, 14, 22 discusses the term ‘soldierology’ for dubious soldiers’ stories. For the rather dismissive view that
former officers often have concerning the stories of their soldiers, see Ross, ‘Holiday at War’, in Maddock, Memories of Vietnam,
221. Ham: Vietnam: the Australian War, 635.
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of war.

Paul Fussell claimed the public and politicians require the presentation of war as
26

'wholesome fun' with the aim of reassuring the public at home.

Many Vietnam War stories

are what the public wants to hear. The public formed a view of war through stories that
have been used in movies such as Platoon, The Deer Hunter, Apocalypse Now, Red Badge of
Courage, Full Metal Jacket, and Paths to Glory just to name a few; and in TV movies,
27

particularly from popular series like MASH (set in the Korean War) and China Beach.

It

should be noted that Australia and the United States shared almost identical pop culture
thanks to television. Portelli makes the observation that public opinion and the media
28

may prefer fantasies, unreliable sources and myths to the reality of the soldiers’ world.
The media and general public want to believe stories that fit their knowledge of the war, and
29

filter out any contradictory voices to their own interpretation.

Participants themselves are

obviously influenced by the way the war has been portrayed in popular culture. It is easier
for a soldier to narrate a story about his or her past that fits, for example, a group’s
nationalistic or ethnic mythology, rather than contradict their audiences’ expectations.

On the other hand, some Vietnam veterans have chosen to exaggerate the horrors that they
encountered there. These veterans did not seek to portray themselves as heroes but attempted
to transform themselves into ‘tragic figures or as eyewitnesses to extreme events’.

30

As

Patrick Hagopian has argued, ‘such stories can rivet listeners by allowing them privileged
31

knowledge of taboo subjects’.

Or, as Gary Kulik has claimed:

No other war in American history produced so many soldiers who lied,
not about being heroes, but about being victims.

And no other war in

history produced so many apologists for those “victims” who committed real
32

atrocities.
It should be acknowledged too that there is no such thing as a single, united
‘soldiers’ voice’. As Garton notes, veterans and veteran organisations are in fact often
25. Tyquin, Madness in the Military, 17.
26. Paul Fussell, The Great War in Modern Memory, New York, 1975, 28.
27. Gary Kulik, War Stories: False Atrocity Tales, Swift Boaters, and Winter Soldiers – What Really Happened in Vietnam?
Potomac Books, Washington, 2009, 14-17.
28. Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out, 120.
29. Portelli, The Order Has been Carried Out, 120.
30. Patrick Hagopian, ‘Voices from Vietnam: Veterans’ Oral Histories in the Classroom’, The Journal of American History, Vol.
87, Issue 2, September 2000, 595.
31. Hagopian, ‘Voices From Vietnam’, 595. 32. Kulik, War Stories, 182.
32. Kulik, War Stories, 182.
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divided.

Particular groups such as Japanese prisoners of war or those who suffered from

Agent Orange demand that their particular cases are examined and are often then accused of
33

seeking special treatment.

Within my platoon of thirty-three individuals, the only thing

that we shared, apart from our service, was that in 1967 we were mostly in our twenties
and confronted with the greatest challenge of our lives up to that point.

There were

differences between regulars and national servicemen, Protestants and Catholics, gung-ho
soldiers and reluctant conscripts. After the war there were many disagreements; a fellow
platoon member and myself almost came to blows when discussing the rights and wrongs of
the Vietnam War. In what sense then, could my history be their history?

How could the

platoon take ownership of a history that I was creating?

As a participant interviewer, I had to acknowledge that I would not be an unbiased contributor
to the historical record. I knew that my status as the commander of the platoon was likely
34

to impact on the testimony of my interviewees.

How sensitive would I be as a listener to

the testimony of others? Would the soldiers of my platoon only tell me what they thought
that I wanted to hear?

If that was the case, is it possible to cross-reference their

narratives with a view to getting closer to the ‘truth’? I did not want simply to write
about how the war was remembered over time by a group of veterans. My aim was to improve
our knowledge of the events of 1967.

My ultimate aim was to write a history of my platoon within the context of the Australian war
in Vietnam. A book, of course, is different to a thesis. The reason for writing this thesis is to
try to understand how academic history deals with the issues that arose in the course of my
research. My main concern was whether oral history would help to bring us closer to the
events of 1967, or simply constitute another source of unreliable testimony. Is it possible for
oral history to add to our knowledge of events that took place decades earlier?

My research method was to record the oral histories of the soldiers of my platoon, and
then analyse their testimony for differences and similarities, paying particular attention to the
areas that appeared to conflict with established recorded histories. One advantage I
believe I had was that I knew how to read the most important written documents for

33 Stephen Garton, The Cost of War, Australians Return, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, 244-5.
34. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 233, 235. Portelli, Battle of Valle Giulia, 10-29.
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cross-checking the narratives of my narrators.

My initial hypothesis was that the

Commander’s Diary – that is, the record of events on the battlefield documented by the
commander’s staff in an official log – had not properly reflected what actually happened on
the battlefield. In other words the Commander’s Diary was likely to be an elite source, which
sought to tidy up the battlefield story in ways that suited the military establishment. At one
level, this hypothesis was confirmed – the Commander’s Diary emphasises the positive and
not the negative side of what occurred on the battlefield. At another level, to my surprise,
my narrators’ version of events was often confirmed by checking the relevant
35

Commander’s Diary.

This led me to one of my conclusions, which was, that

supplementing oral history with primary sources, especially the Commander’s Diary was the
best way to piece together a more accurate account of the platoon’s history.
It should be noted that most books about Vietnam rely upon interviews with former soldiers.
Paul Ham’s Vietnam notes in its introduction the names of more than one hundred soldiers
interviewed for his preparation of this book. For Fragments of Vietnam: An Oral History of
36

Australians at War, Gary McKay interviewed fifty veterans.

Stuart Rintoul in Ashes of

Vietnam quotes about two hundred soldiers. What is different about my study is that it
is a corporate history, the narrators are not officers, and my study allows for
comparisons of soldiers’ testimony about the same event to which they were eyewitnesses.

Finally, I had to acknowledge that most writing about Australian soldiers is written either
with direct reference to or in the shadow of the ‘ANZAC legend’. After each war the military
hierarchy and rank-and-file veterans make their own new contributions to the ANZAC
legend but usually in a form compatible with the template established by Charles Bean, the
first official Australian war correspondent who chronicled the heroic achievements of
37

Australian soldiers at Gallipoli.

While the military campaigns – Gallipoli, Singapore,

Vietnam – may have ended in defeat, popular literature and ANZAC Day speeches focus on
what are regarded as the best qualities of the Australian soldier. Military legends are used to
38

provide meaning, direction and order, and to cover up the unpalatable bits of warfare.

35. AWM95/1/4/7, 1 ATF Duty Officers’ Log Nov 67, Serials 4869, 4877, 4879, 4885. AWM95/7/2/46, 2RAR Duty Officer’s Log
Sheet, Serials 1304, 1307, 1312. McNeill and Ekins, On The Offensive, 264.
36. Gary McKay, Fragments of Vietnam, An Oral History of Australians at War, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1992, 281-88.
37. D. A. Kent, The ANZAC book and The ANZAC Legend: C.E.W. Bean as editor and image–maker, Historical Studies, 1985,
Routledge, London, 21, 84, 376-90. Http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war.
38. Robert Grant, The Way of the Wound, A Spirituality of Trauma and Transformation, Oakland, California, 1996.
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Australian soldiers returning from the battlefield often embraced the most important
Australian military tradition – the ANZAC legend – because it offered membership of an
exclusive club upon their return to civilian life, a reason for their service and a sense of
39

meaning.

From another perspective Lake and Reynolds argue that soldiers and their legends

already have a too great a hold over Australian historical public memory.40

According to Mandle, the ANZAC s o l d i e r has come down in the popular imagination
as 'tough and inventive, loyal to ... mates beyond the call of duty, a bit undisciplined (but
41

only in non-essentials), chivalrous, gallant, sardonic'.

Or, as Stockings has put it, ANZAC represented:

a distinct collection of values, both real and imagined. It embodied the
perceived

comradeship

of

front-line

soldiers,

the

rejection

of conventional discipline, physical strength, egalitarianism, loyalty, selfsacrifice, courage, and early twentieth-century conceptions of
masculinity. It was centred on success, not defeat. If someone failed at
Gallipoli, it was not the Australians – therefore it must have been the
incompetent, aristocratic British generals they were forced to serve
42

under.

In the case of the Vietnam War, failure could be attributed to allegedly arrogant and culturally
insensitive American generals with no experience of jungle warfare rather than the
‘incompetent, aristocratic British’. History is often written as a national myth upon which
43

a national identity is forged, and in a way that is useful to a group identity.

Seal sees the ANZAC mythology as the uneasy cohabitation of two traditions: the Digger

39. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 23-128.
40. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds with Mark McKenna and Joy Damousi, What's wrong with ANZAC The Militarisation
of Australian History, New South Publishing, Kensington, 2010.
41. W. F. Mandle, Going It Alone, Penguin, Ringwood, 1978, 3-23.
42. Craig Stockings, ‘The ANZAC Legend and the Battle of Bardia’, War In History, vol. 17, issue 1, 2010, 87.
43. Paul Thompson, Voice of the Past, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, 178. Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out, 4.
Grey and Doyle, Vietnam, War, Myth and Memory, xiii, 137-8. Lex McAulay, ‘Vietnam Myth’ in Wartime, vol. 20 writes about
eight of the most common myths and declares them as false. Grey ‘In Every War But One? Myth, History and Vietnam’ in
Craig Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney 2010, 190-1.
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44

tradition and the ANZAC tradition.

As the footnotes to this thesis will testify, Australian

soldiers in Vietnam were mostly referred to as ‘diggers’, the other side of the ANZAC coin.
While ‘ANZAC’ was official and public, the term ‘digger’ referred to the larrikin, antiauthoritarian ordinary soldiers who did the dirty work of war.

ANZAC and digger have

much in common however in terms of constituting the stereotype of the typical Australian
soldier.

ANZAC conveniently balances the grief and loss of veterans with that of the heroism,
45

s e nse of purpose and camaraderie of those involved in fighting the war.

Adulation of veterans becomes the paramount objective rather than accuracy in chronicling
their experience. One difficulty created by this ANZAC image is that terrible events such
as the killing of civilians have no place there.

The villains in the ANZAC legend are

aristocratic English officers or American generals ignorant of the real conditions on the
battlefield. This legend does not throw a spotlight on the dark side of Australia’s war in
Vietnam. The ANZAC legend suggests that war is a test that Australians pass with flying
colours, not a hell from which some soldiers never recover. This was the premier message for
the public memory.

In recent years there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the Australian experience
in Vietnam was far more complex than the heroic ANZAC legend allows. On the other hand,
it may suit veterans to have a ready-made story that presents them as heroes as the battlefield
46

reality was sometimes too difficult to believe, and often too horrible to discuss.

This

ready-made heroic narrative allows ordinary soldiers to avoid the unpleasant side of war.
The ANZAC legend compensated for the fact that the standard day-to-day activities of
ordinary soldiers have mostly proved too unexciting to attract much attention. However, this
legend can drown out the often-troubled voices of the participants.
At the very least, oral histories and personal interviews put flesh on the ‘date, place, unit’
skeleton of official history.

It is important that this work is done soon as the Vietnam

veteran community is passing away.

Of the 33 members of my platoon, four died in

action in Vietnam and four since their return to Australia.
44. Graham Seal, Inventing ANZAC The Digger and National Methodology, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 2004, 3-8.
45. Thompson, Voices of the Past, 96. Grey and Doyle, Vietnam, War, Myth and Memory, 137-8.
46. Grant, The Way of the Wound.
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Chapter One presents an account of the strengths and weaknesses of oral history.

It

examines some of the ways in which soldiers’ testimony about the Vietnam War have
been used and abused. Chapter Two discusses the methodology and details the interviewing
process. Chapter Three looks at how the ‘collateral damage’ of civilian casualties in the
Vietnam War has been dealt with in the academic and popular literature. It includes a
description of the ambush resulting in the deaths of civilians that is at the centre of this thesis.
Chapter Four examines the Government and Defence’s reaction to an accusation by Jim
Cairns, former deputy Prime Minister, that Australian soldiers killed civilians. Chapter Five
looks at the written primary evidence and oral history surrounding the ambush involving
the platoon.

Chapter Six concludes with a discussion of memory and factors which may

have influenced the memories of the soldiers in the ambush, while it examines the conclusions
we can draw from the oral history.

In summary my thesis is novel because it is the first time that a platoon commander has
attempted a scholarly oral history of his platoon members. Most existing unit histories are
written to remember and celebrate the deeds and sacrifice of the fallen. The obvious difficult
is the power imbalance between myself and the narrators. As Michael Frisch has pointed out
the only solution to that problem is the interviewer to be aware of this power and the need to
47

share his authority with his narrators.

47. Frisch Michael, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History, State University of New
York Press, Albany, 1990.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF ORAL HISTORY
LITERATURE REVIEW
ORAL HISTORY

Oral history was first used extensively after World War Two to record the testimony of those
who survived the Nazi Holocaust.
The Past.

1

In the 1970s, Paul Thompson wrote The Voice of

In this work he traced oral history from its early uses through to its

modern incarnation.

2

He made the point that oral history is not new and many different

types of specialists use it in their research.

3

In this book, Thompson also defended oral

history against critics who claim that memory was an unreliable source.

4

Oral history

became more popular from the 1970s as it was looked upon as a means of empowering those
whose voices were seldom heard in elite history.
Oral history concerns itself with the people about whom history ‘ is’ often silent,
perhaps because their narratives did not match the dominant cultural memory. Abrams notes
that oral history has served as an antidote to elite history. Various oppressed groups have
used oral history to explore the history of war, colonialism, racism, and women.
history and Afro-American history benefited greatly from the use of oral history.

Oral history attracted its critics as well.

5

Women’s

6

It has been argued that oral history relies upon

memories that are selective and fragile and that this invalidates memory as a source of
history.

7

As O’Farrell argued:

The basic problem with oral history about the past is that its truth (when it is
true) is not primarily about what happened or how things were, but about

1. Abrams, Oral History Theory, 154.
2. Thompson, Voice of the Past, 5, 100.
3. Thompson, Voice of the Past, 82.
4. Thompson, Voice of the Past, 8, 9, 118-36, 170-2. Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’ in Ritchie, The
Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 79.
5. Abrams, Oral History Theory, 151-61.
6. Abrams, Oral History Theory, 8, 131, 140, 169.
7. Windsor, All Day Long, 20.
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how the past has been recollected. We move straight away into the world
of image, selective memory, later overlays and utter subjectivity.

8

As Portelli contended, many historians accepted the dominant prejudice which sees factual
credibility as the monopoly of written documents, refusing to even countenance that (written)
documents, like oral histories, are ‘sometimes incomplete, inaccurate and deceiving’.

9

Portelli points to the concentration of historians on ‘elite’ interviews with leaders rather than
the rank and file.

10

At first, oral historians were very defensive about their craft. Yet it turned out that oral
history had much in common with the methodologies of other disciplines such as cultural
anthropology.

Janis Wilton has noted that oral history has moved from the margins to
11

complex and sophisticated theories and methods. Valerie has argued that from the late
1980s a new oral history paradigm permitted ‘awareness and use of the interactive process of
interviewer and narrator, of interviewer and content’.

12

Yow writes about exploring the

relationship between memory, narrative, and personal identity. She notes that there is a
‘trickle over’ effect from other disciplines such as qualitative sociology, anthropology,
biographical and literary studies, and life review psychology.

13

The cultural anthropologist

rejects the positivist idea that investigators are seeking and will find objective truth. Instead
of a researcher ‘discovering’ information by observing his or her subjects, fieldwork is
viewed as an interaction, a sharing of knowledge.

One result is multi or poly vocal

information where different voices are heard and not simply shoehorned into a narrative
preferred by the investigator, who usually came from a culturally political and economically
dominant world.
By the 1990s oral history was very well established because social, cultural and military
history had all benefited from its approach and methods. Portelli argued that ‘the peculiarities
of oral history - orality, narrative form, subjectivity, the different credibility of memory,

8. Patrick O’Farrell, ‘Oral History: Facts and Fiction’ Oral History Association of Australia Journal, vol. 5, 1983, 3-9 (reprinted
from Quadrant). Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’ in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 79.
9. Alessandro Portelli, ‘What makes Oral History Different’ in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 37.
Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 26. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 227, 228.
10. Graham Smith, ‘Towards a Public Oral History’ in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 441. Grey and Doyle,
Vietnam, Myth and memory, ix, x, 150. Portelli, Battle of Valle Guilia, 188.
11. Janis Wilton, ‘Oral History in Universities: From Margins to Mainstream’ in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History,
470-84.
12. Yow, ‘Do I Like Them too Much?’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 54. Valerie Yow, ‘Do I
Like Them Too Much? Effects of the Oral History Interview on the Interviewer and Vice-Versa,’ Oral History Review, vol. 24,
Issue 1, 1997, 55-79.
13. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 81, 83.
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and the relationship between interviewer and interviewee – should be considered as a
strength rather than a weakness, a resource rather than a problem’.

14

Portelli’s narrators not

only tell us what they did, but what they wanted to do and what they think they did.

15

One of

Portelli’s contributions is his analysis of the stories told by participants rather than simply
seeing oral history as an eyewitness account. For Portelli, oral sources are credible but have
a different credibility to written sources. Portelli notes that oral history interviewing is a
‘multi-vocal art’, and not a precise science.
‘psychologically true’.

17

16

A factually dubious statement may still be

Notwithstanding this point of view, Portelli believes that oral

history has a responsibility to follow proven procedures for collecting information.

18

But he

is equally interested in how narrators choose to remember events, and how their discourse
serves their purposes. Or as another writer suggested:
We need as historians to consider myth and memory, not only as special
clues to the past, but equally as windows on the making and remaking of
individual consciousness, in which both fact and fantasy, past and present
each has its part.

19

Portelli points out that a ‘verbal’ art like oral history implies a degree of interaction with the
interviewer asking unexpected questions to explore new areas of experience or to articulate
what is taken for granted and not normally verbalised.

20

Portelli notes that the oral historian has to be an especially attentive listener. He uses an
analysis of the narrations to suggest that a narrator’s choice of pronouns and verbs means that
the narrator is questioning their identity.

21

He suggests, for example, that as the narrative

shifts towards the plural, the narrator is being assumed into the collective identity of, for
example, the armed forces, and develops a shared identity. Portelli believes that narratives
often tell us the psychological costs of memory; namely what the narrator wished had
happened and would like to believe had happened. It is part of the interviewer’s art to have

14. Portelli, ‘What Oral History Different’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 32. Thomson,
‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 80. See also the special
section on “History, Memory and the Work of Alessandro Portelli”, Oral History Review, vol. 32, Issue 1, 2005, 1-34.
15. Portelli, ‘What Makes Oral History D i ff e r e n t ’, i n Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 36.
16. Portelli, Battle of Valle Giulia, 24. Yow, ‘Do I Like Them too Much?’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader
Second Edition, 64-6.
17. Portelli, ‘What Makes Oral History D i f f e r e n t ’ , i n P e r k s a nd T h om s on , The Oral History Reader, 37. Portelli, Death
of Luigi Trastulli, 51.
18. Valerie Yow, ‘Do I Like Them too Much?’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 62-3. Portelli,
Battle of Valle Giulia, 55, 64.
19. Raphael Samuel and Paul Richard Thompson, The Myths We Live By, Routledge, London, 1990, 21.
20. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 12, 16. Yow ‘Do I Like Them too Much?’ 64-7.
21. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 166. Portelli, Battle of Valle Giulia, 55, 64.
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the narrator paint a word picture of what had actually happened. Portelli in his work observes
that sometimes an interviewer and narrator of opposing points of view may produce a good
interview due to the fact that both sides are trying to establish their point of view and win the
other person over, while getting the satisfaction of having their view recorded.

22

The oral

historian has to understand the nature of narration. Often, the narrator places himself or
herself in a public event; oral history allows that narrator to express where that narrator stood
in recorded history.

23

At the same time, oral history can shed light on events in the distant past when used correctly.
Ritchie warns that oral histories should be prepared in conjunction with conventional sources
of information, because public memory of the war can affect individual memory.

24

Ritchie

develops the theme that historians should seek concrete evidence of what actually happened
and document it fully.

25

He suggests that one of the basic elements of oral history is an

interviewer who pursues issues raised in narratives by questioning the narrator. This is a
hypothesis that the evidence collected for my thesis strongly supports. A narrator may not
offer a first-hand account, but instead repeats rumour, gossip or hearsay because he or she
considers that the audience has certain expectations of his narration.

26

According to Lynn Abrams, the ‘Oral Historian, broadly speaking, asks people questions to
discover four things: what happened, how they felt about it, how they recall it, and what wider
public memory they draw upon’. Abrams suggests that the markers of oral history are orality,
memory, narrative, subjectivity and performativity.

Memory is also a ‘socially-shared

experience’. According to Abrams:
Memory is not just about the individual; it is about the community, the
collective attitudes and norms, and the national image of that time. In this
regard, memory – both collective and individual – exists in a symbiotic
relationship with the public memory and the idealised history of the
past, so we must always be aware that memory expressed in an
interview exists within a field of memories, with many levels and nuances,
that is an ongoing process, at many levels in our society.

27

22. Portelli, Battle of Valle Guilia, 12.
23. Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 3-4. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 6.
24. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 37.
25. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 38.
26. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 38. Thompson, Voice of the Past, 170-4. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 13.
27. Abrams, Oral History Theory, 79.
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Abrams notes that narrators ‘compose’ their narratives and do not simply remember. One
aspect of composure is ‘the striving on the part of the interviewee for a version of the self that
sits comfortably within the social world’. The second related understanding of composure is
that of composing a story that serves the purposes of the storyteller.

28

Memory becomes part

of an individual’s identity, each constituting a part of the other.

Perks and Thomson suggest that oral history has synergies with studies of culture, narrative,
and folklore.

29

Memory serves a purpose of binding a group together; there is therefore a

danger that those dissenting from the ‘group memory’ will not be heard.

Thomson

hypothesises that we compose our memory so as to help us to be comfortable with our lives.

30

He writes that our memories are composed to make sense of our past and our present lives.
To compose our memories, we use the public language and meanings of our culture. We
remake or repress our memories, which are still painful and ‘unsafe’ because they do not
conform to the public norms or versions of the past.

31

It was logical that ordinary soldiers became the subject of oral history because they too were
often ignored in standard accounts that focused upon the brilliance or the mistakes of great
commanders.

Thomson’s ANZAC Memories focused upon the myths that grew up about

Australia’s involvement in the Great War 1915-1918. Thomson wrote about durable memory
and why some memories refuse to fade.

32

He examined why narratives are important to

history and how oral history can be defended against those who do not wish to listen to
historical narratives outside of the traditional collection, production and presentation of
history.

He also highlighted the memory paradox in that long-term memory is usually

reliable, but nonetheless recalling is a process of making and remaking and that this is the key
to understanding oral history. He hypothesised that listening to the narrator’s own insights
about their memory helps the interviewer understand the narrator’s history.

33

In ANZAC Memories, Thomson tackles the question of the popular memory of war, and wrote
28. Abrams, Oral History Theory, 128.
29. Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 5.
30. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 237. Thomson, ‘ANZAC Memories’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second
Edition, 245.
31. Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second
Edition, 43-53. Anna Green, ‘Individual Remembering and Collective Memory: Theoretical Propositions and Contemporary
Debates,’ Oral History, 2004, vol. 32, 35-44. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 4.
32. Thomson in ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’ in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 77-95.
33. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 227-8. Thomson, ‘ANZAC Memories’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second
Edition, 250-3. Portelli, Battle of Valle Giulia, 10-12.
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about how participants tend to tailor their recollections of events to fit the popular memory.
His aim was to find the story as experienced by the soldiers as young men.

34

Thomson’s

approach was to focus on the memory of a particular experience, and then to peel away the layers of
35

meaning that have been constructed around it over time, and in different social contexts. In effect,
this means to start with today's memory and work back through earlier articulations of the same
experience. Sometimes this approach can be facilitated by answers to direct questions about
changes in identity and memory, but often it requires a careful reading of the oral history
transcript, to sort out the various layers of memory, and the chronology. This approach can be richly
rewarding for an understanding of the ways in which memories have been composed.
Thomson writes about Fred Farrell, a war veteran who narrated that ‘he was terrified in battle,
miserable in the trenches…’ His best mates were killed and mutilated at his side, though Fred
survived in one piece.

36

Fred’s excellent memory of traumatic events may reflect his

experience of surviving, or even his feeling of guilt in surviving an unbelievably
traumatic event. The recollection of this failure to follow his survival instincts may need
only a few words, an image or some effect on sensory faculties, to bring these memories and
survival messages instantly to the front of his mind again.

37

Thomson notes that the prospect of death meant that the veterans had a focus that brings these
past experiences to a central place in their memory.

38

Gerard Windsor wrestles with the issue

of memory when he states that ‘survival is paramount and anything not relevant to surviving
39

is shed’.

This shedding affects memory. Windsor takes the view that it is the memories

that are important to the individual soldier that endure.

40

If there are too many facts to deal

with, the veteran sheds information, which is not directly necessary to him. This reflects
Windsor’s point of view that only survival matters, and memory is often linked to that
premise.

41

The fact that some memories are traumatic explains why veterans’ memories of

certain incidents are so clear. Soldiers involved in taking the life of an enemy do so without
42

question and without the normal legal or societal sanctions. Soldiers are trained so that even

34. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 228.
35. Thomson, ‘ANZAC Memories’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 245.
36. Thomson, ‘ANZAC Memories’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 248.
37. Nadel and Jacobs, ‘Traumatic Memory Is Special’, Current Directions in Psychological Science, vol. 7, No. 5, 154-7.
38. Thomson, ‘ANZAC Memories’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 248-53.
39. Windsor, All Day Long, 2.
40. Windsor, All Day Long, 27-8.
41. Windsor, All Day Long, 20-1.
42. Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 85.
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if they would normally be frozen in terror, they go into an automated trained response. Yet
there seems to be no forgetting these moments whatever the level of training. There is
evidence that as individuals grow older, they struggle to manage the storage of short- term
memory, while the long-term memory seems to be enhanced.

43

This enhancement is

consistent with research that shows that immigrants to the United States cannot remember
their daughter’s phone number but can remember details of their arrival on those shores.

44

Thomson, Thompson, Ritchie and Yow are sure that long-term memory for research purposes
is reliable. The conclusion is that memory keeps the general shape of the events and incidents
that are important to the individual but not necessarily to the group.

Memory is an area of contested research in the medical, legal and history fields. Thomson’s
research indicates that veterans tend to couch their narratives in terms that make sense and
are of value to them.

As Portelli indicates, there can be a psychological factor in

narrating events by people who have been part of an era of history.

45

Often the set

narratives, recasting, re-imagining, reprocessing, construction and assembling of memories
are strategies not only to ease the soldiers’/narrators’ post-traumatic stress, but also to fit with
popular memories and to conform with the view of legend and custodians of the myth.

46

Thomson writes that his narrators saw his research as providing an opportunity to have their
stories heard as history.

47

Soldiers might also view the giving of a narrative as a venue for

their personal and collective experiences to be perceived as history by a wider public
audience. As Thomson has put it, some veterans’ memories did not match the
dominant cultural memory, and in these cases the veteran’s memory hangs onto the incident,
until it can find a resolution within the national myth.

48

Thomson writes that oral history can be used to change the focus of history itself and open up
new areas of inquiry. Thomson goes on to say that oral history can give back to the people
who made and experienced that history through their own words, a central place.

The

narratives of the participants in this research carve out a history, which varies from the some
43. Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 83.
44. Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 82.
45. Portelli, ‘What makes oral history Different’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 36.
46. Portelli, Death of Luigi Trastulli, 1. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 229, 235.
47. Thomson, ANZAC Legend, 233.
48. Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 81.
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parts of the official histories, while remaining true to the timeline of the popular and cultural
authorized records.

PROBLEMATIC HISTORY
Much of the literature about the Vietnam War concerns the making and debunking of myths,
that is, fictional or imagined occurrences that have become widely believed. Since the end of
the Vietnam War, many books have been published featuring dramatic first-hand accounts of
combat and the soldiers, especially the American soldiers’ experience.

Yet often these

accounts appear to many veterans as fanciful. The credibility of oral histories of the Vietnam
War has been seriously undermined by the myths that are often repeated in the published
popular history literature of the era, which appear to rely for evidence on the testimony of
soldiers.

49

Any attempt to evaluate the testimony of soldiers has to acknowledge that a significant
amount of the popular and academic literature contains stories attributed to veterans
that have been shown to be completely untrue.

50

Some accounts have been written by and

about individuals whose stories about their Vietnam service is widely repeated yet who, on
closer inspection, never even served in Vietnam.

51

Some who did go to Vietnam chose to

exaggerate the horrors that they encountered there. Arguably the two most popular offenders
in this category are Mark Baker’s Nam: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and
Women Who Fought There, and Wallace Terry’s Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War
By Black Veterans.

52

Terry’s book takes the reader through the journey of veterans from

civilian life through enlistment, induction, initial and pre-deployment training, to the war, and
then back home.

The underlying issue is the subjective relationship between the African

American, service to the nation and racial discrimination.

53

Bloods has come in for a great deal of criticism. Terry was a journalist who went to Vietnam
to write about the experiences of black soldiers in the American Army. Bloods contains the
recollections of Harold ‘Light Bulb’ Bryant who had an eventful tour of duty by his own
account. Bryant claimed that he spent much of the war as a specialist engineer who disarmed
booby traps and mines. He saw a soldier prevent a ‘bouncing betty’ mine from exploding by

49. Mark Baker, Nam, The Vietnam War in the Words of Men and Women Who Fought There, Abacus, London, 1982. Wallace
Terry, Bloods, An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans, Random House, New York, 1984. Stuart Rintoul, Ashes
of Vietnam, William Heinemann, Richmond, 1988, 78, 83, 98-100, 118, 119, 129, 144, 147, 148, 154, 166, 170-5.
50. Gary Kulik, War Stories, 17, 19, 21, 71, 93, 154, 201, 245. Bernard Gary Burkett, Glenna Whiteley, Stolen Valor, Verity Press,
Dallas Texas, 1998, 385-451, 455-9.
51. Burkett, Whiteley, Stolen Valor.
52. Baker, Nam. Terry, Bloods.
53. Portelli, Battle of Valle Giulia, 168-71. 54. Terry, Bloods, xv-xviii.
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keeping his foot on it while his comrades moved to safety. He also saw enemy bodies thrown
out of helicopters, the cutting off of ears, necrophilia, torture of the enemy, the burning of
villages, friendly fire, brothels set up alongside military camps, and most spectacularly of all,
he took part in a daring drop from a helicopter over Cambodia with a team assigned to rescue
a disabled helicopter.

54

Yet, as one sceptical investigator points out, Bryant was a dump-truck driver for most of his
tour of duty. While he had a few weeks training as a Pioneer combat engineer, he
received no awards and there is no record of his raid into Cambodia.

55

The fanciful

remembering of Bryant has spread far and wide. Portelli examines the American Vietnam
experience in a chapter entitled ‘As Though It was a Story – Versions of Vietnam’.

56

Here,

he uses the selected narratives of Vietnam veterans in Bloods. Portelli describes Bryant’s
heroic efforts to save his fellow soldiers from a mine that was about to explode.
story seems to be a classic case of a Vietnam myth.

58

57

But this

Such problematic yarns have become a

disturbing feature of the purported ‘oral history’ of the Vietnam War coming out of the
United States.

59

As Hagopian has put it, Wallace Terry ‘cut and pasted his transcribed

interviews’ to meet the conventions of storytelling that he had learned in a creative writing
class.

60

Another dubious collection of eyewitness accounts is Mark Baker’s Nam. Baker’s narrators
are anonymous and behind the cover of their pseudonyms offer allegedly authentic testimony
of what fighting the Vietnam War ‘was really like’.

Baker chose to collect the most

sensational (and unlikely) stories that emerged from the testimony of his interviewees, and to
place these tall tales alongside other narratives that do ring true to veterans. One American
veteran commented that ‘Mark Baker's Nam is palatable to the unknowing and inexperienced,
but is, among very well-read, intelligent Vietnam veterans, believed to be collection of
‘invented fabrications[sic]’.

61

Baker and Terry allowed their interviews to be turned into fiction.

62

Perhaps they failed to

recognise fabrications because they themselves had not served on the ground in Vietnam.

55. Hagopian, ‘Voices from Vietnam’, 594. Burkett and Whitley, Stolen Valor, 456.
56. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, 167-9.
57. Terry, Bloods, 19-31. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, 167.
58. Hagopian, ‘Voices From Vietnam’, 596.
59. Burkett and Whitley, Stolen Valor, 456-7.
60. Hagopian, ‘Voices From Vietnam’, 597.
61. Email, Bill Laurie to Ben Morris, Re: Oral History and the Vietnam War, Thursday, 16 June 2011.
62. Email, Laurie. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, 76.
63. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 64.
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63

Perhaps they found their narrator’s stories so captivating that they just hoped they were
true.

64

One problem is that genuine veterans feel that their history has been stolen and oral

history itself suffers devastating blows to its credibility. Another problem is that historians’
interpretations can rely upon these problematic building blocks.

Portelli analyses the

atrocity stories in the works of Baker and Terry, giving the impression that they had some
basis in fact.

Portelli offers an explanation of how Baker and Terry’s soldiers tried to

understand or justify what they had done. Portelli notes that one soldier had remembered
how he had turned himself into a god above the normal rules of morality.

Portelli describes

how combat leads to the ‘difficulty, for those who have been animal, machine, zombie,
and God, to become again mere human beings’.

65

But what if the stories that underpin such

conclusions are pure fabrications?

It might be argued that knowledgeable readers will quickly point out the errors in this
‘remembered’ mythology. In reality, soldiers as well as civilians find it difficult to distinguish
fact from fantasy. One of the most common of the problematic stories from Vietnam is a
story similar to that told by Bryant earlier of the soldier who, hearing the click of a mine
arming to explode, keeps his foot on the mine until the area is cleared and steps can be
taken to rescue his comrades. In an Australian case, the Official History series records an
account of second lieutenant John Fraser who prevented a mine from exploding until all his
men were safe.

66

One of my narrators recalled arriving in Brisbane to read the story of

John Fraser’s death.

67

The narrator and Fraser had attended the same school. My narrator

was very upset telling this story and I had to stop taping while he regained his composure.

Lockhart has investigated this story. Two journalists were travelling with Fraser’s company
but were not direct eyewitnesses to the explosion. They later described how Fraser had the
time and presence of mind to let his platoon know that he had stepped on a mine and gave
them all the opportunity to remove themselves from the blast area. Then he took his foot off
the mine and blew himself up. Lockhart has comprehensively debunked this particular story
and, more broadly, the possibility of being able to delay a mine explosion.

Lockhart

concludes that the story was a fiction of the journalist Pat Burgess’s imagination. But this is
not just a case of civilians lacking technical knowledge about military matters. Even the
official historian has accepted the newspaper report rather than checking with actual
68

eyewitnesses, Army training manuals, and mine warfare technical experts. One of Rintoul’s
64. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, 20.
65. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 178.
66. McNeill and Ekins, On The Offensive, 336.
67. Unidentified, ‘Mine Kills Officer’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26/03/1968, 1.
68. McNeill and Ekins, On The Offensive, 336.
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narrators repeats this apocryphal story.

69

It seems that both academic and popular military history requires the telling of tall tales to
ensure a satisfyingly heroic image of courageous Australian soldiers under fire is
manufactured. The persistence of this type of story confirms that myths are not just invented
by those in power, but often emerge from the ranks of front line soldiers and those charged
with writing their history.

70

When soldiers interview other soldiers there is a temptation to

reconstruct a shared past that will reflect well on both of them. This may explain the
congratulatory and celebratory theme that Grey and Doyle critique in their writings on the
Vietnam War.

71

Portelli makes the observation that public opinion and the media may prefer

fantasies, unreliable sources and myths to the reality of the participants.

72

Soldiers,

consciously and unconsciously, may seek to portray events in a light that satisfies the
expectation of their audience.
popular memory.

73

There is a temptation to reconstruct a past that reflects

74

The American War in Vietnam is unusual for the fact that so many veterans have spoken or
written about their having witnessed war crimes and atrocities. One of the most common
atrocity stories from the Vietnam War revolves around the throwing of Vietnamese out of
helicopters. The story goes right back to the start of the war and is repeated i n a number
of books including Bloods, Nam and Ashes of Vietnam, Portelli quotes narrators who relate
this story.

A variation on the theme is dropping a water buffalo from a helicopter.

Enemy soldiers were thrown out of helicopters to encourage other captured enemy soldiers to
talk, so the storyline goes.

Yet as Kulik points out, helicopters were difficult places in which to conduct interrogations.
In reality, every enemy soldier constituted an excellent source of intelligence. In that context,
dropping them out of a helicopter does not make sense; corroborating evidence that such
events took place is always lacking.
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This myth is repeated to demonstrate power and

control by the Americans over the Vietnamese, or perhaps to shock the audience or both. In
the Australian service imagination, this ‘enemy thrown out of helicopters’ story can be

69. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 98.
70. McNeill and Ekins, On The Offensive, 336, Terry, Bloods, 21. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 118. Portelli, The Battle of Valle
Giulia, 167.
71. Grey and Doyle, Vietnam, War, Myth and Memory, ix-x, xiii, 137-50.
72. Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out, 120.
73. Windsor, All Day Long, 22.
74. Jerry Lembcke, The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam, New York University Press, New York, 1998,
117, 170.
75. Kulik, War Stories, 133, 136, 138, 154 – 55.
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traced back to 1965, when the First Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was part of
the American 173rd Airborne Brigade.

In the obituary of Chaplain Gerry Cudamore,

Alan Ramsay wrote how the padre had heard this story from the soldiers and was concerned
about its authenticity.

76

While oral history may collect problematic history laced with rumour, gossip, legend and
myth, it also presents the reality of the narrator. Military history seems to collect tall tales to
reinforce the celebratory and laudatory theme of the national myth. It is necessary for each
and every genre of history continually to verify their information with other sources.

76. Alan Ramsey, ‘The Bicycle Padre’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2004.
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHODOLGY

Over the last two decades, I have interviewed dozens of veterans of the Vietnam War and
have been in correspondence with dozens more. The testimony of these veterans constituted
the primary research that I have undertaken. Organising this material, making sense of it and
interpreting it in the light of oral history has proved as challenging a task as locating and
talking to veterans. The aim of this chapter is to explain the circumstances in which my
narrators have offered their testimony and how I have chosen to use the information provided
in my studies.
This thesis is based primarily on the oral histories of thirty-four Australian Vietnam veterans,
eighteen of whom were members of the same platoon (2PL) of A Company of the Second
Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR). A brief comment about each of the
participants is given in Appendix 1. The non-platoon oral histories were collected to situate
the information provided by the platoon members. These oral histories outside the platoon
helped to confirm the interview technique that was used in collecting the narratives from my
participants. Among the non-platoon narrators, I interviewed eleven officers who were my
peers. All eleven had been platoon commanders or equivalent and had had operational service
in Vietnam. Two narrators, who were soldiers as distinct from officers, were interviewed.
They had served in Vietnam at a different time to my platoon and they provided a standard
against which to judge my own and narrators’ experiences of the war.
The eighteen narratives offered by platoon members represent a shared history of a platoon on
operations in Vietnam in 1967. The eighteen 2 Platoon veterans break into two distinct
groups: nine were men with whom I have been in contact since the ‘Welcome Home’ march
in 1987. Some had made contact with me prior to that day, but the ‘Welcome Home’ March
re-established contact and was followed up by attendance at ANZAC Day marches,
Regimental Association meetings and reunions, and an annual platoon reunion.

The

remaining nine veterans were those who had no contact or very little contact with me prior to
my conducting an oral history.
The role I initially imagined for myself was that of a boundary rider who would ensure that
the soldiers’ memories did not lapse into fantasy. M y a s s u m p t i o n w a s t h a t m y
narrators knew that I would know if their story was apocryphal or entirely manufactured. An
added benefit was that they would alert me to my own imaginings where my narrative and their
narratives diverged. Veterans sometimes resort to myth so as to meet the need described by
Thomson to conform to public memory. My presence would act as a brake on any attempt to

23

‘gild the lily’. Their presence would have a similar effect on my memory. To some degree,
this may have been true; my narrators appeared to assume that I knew more than I did, and this
assumption acted as a brake on embellishments. The reality was that the narrations moved beyond
any boundaries I set and often yielded information that was new to me. Yow has made the point
1

that oral history is a poly vocal art. In effect my voice and the narrators’ voices became more and
more equal over time as our conversations lengthened and deepened.
My role also appeared to me to be that of a police investigator who separates the witnesses and
tries to ensure that evidence remains ‘uncontaminated’ by the memory of others.

I made a

conscious decision not to reveal the content of other veterans’ oral histories for two main reasons.
My aim was to make the veteran feel secure in the knowledge that all the narrations were
confidential and not up for general discussion or review by their mates. However, I did not give
any instructions to the narrators in regard to discussing their narrations with others, as I believe I
had no authority to give such instruction.

Whether I really did succeed in talking to my

narrators before they talked to each other and whether that would make any difference to the
validity of my project remains an open question.
In discussions with about half of my planned target group over a number of years, one issue that
stood out among all others was that these soldiers felt they had not been heard, and that no one
outside of their fellow veterans understood what they had been through on the battlefield, where
2

most of their time had been spent undertaking hard, unglamorous work.

My oral histories were

influenced by the social and psychological experiences of ageing, the traumatic experiences of the
soldiers, the resurgence of interest in ANZAC Day, and the reintegration of the Vietnam veterans
back into Australian military history.

I tried to follow the advice of Portelli, that the oral

history interviewer is a special listener and questioner, and the interviewer needs to
recognise that the narrators have an agenda of their own.

3

I also attended training

sessions run by Alistair Thomson and Rosie Block from the Oral History Society of NSW to
hone my interviewing style.

4

All participants were approached directly and were requested to sign copyright approvals so
that the Australian War Memorial (AWM) could use their narratives for research purposes. All
but two narrators signed the form to allow the copyright use of their testimony by the AWM.
One narrator refused to sign the agreement until a reference to cowardice was removed
from his narrative. The second narrator did not want any names, including his own, to be used in
the research. As well as the AWM, copies of the tapes and transcripts will be
1. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 81. Yow ‘Do I Like Them too Much?’ 64-6. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 24.
2. Lembcke, The Spitting Image, 117.
3. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 6, 10.
4. Beth M Robertson, Oral History Handbook, Oral History Association of South Australia, Unley, South Australia, 2000.
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given to the narrators. Some had indicated that they intend to hand the material to family
members who were conducting family histories.
Besides the copyright form, a service record summary and a family history were requested
from narrators. The family history was discontinued when veterans became impatient with
the paperwork process. The family history was suggested by the Oral History Association of
Australia but is not essential, as veterans have a unique regimental number, which can be used
4

to gain details of their military service on the Vietnam Veterans’ nominal roll. Their service
records are kept in the National Archives of Australia. I accessed documents in both National
Archives in Melbourne and the Australian War Memorial (AWM) Canberra, where
Commanders’ Dairies, After Action Reports, Investigations into various incidents,
Operational Casualty Reports and other documentation was accessed to cross reference
narratives.
The majority of platoon narrators have maintained contact over the period of research through
reunions and group emails.

About half the narrators have attended the annual platoon

reunion on the Sunday closest to 30 November each year. This function has continued during
the period of research, with additional members attending partly due to the research, and at
the urging of other platoon members. Of the thirty-four narrators, three have died since
giving their testimony. One narrator considered the process of such value that he insisted that
the platoon hold a barbeque at the National Memorial i n Enoggera Barracks Brisbane so
that those members of the platoon who had not been interviewed could do so. No interviews
were conducted at that time, although a number of attendees were interviewed afterwards.
The majority of narrations occurred in the narrator’s home. As their guest, I became known
not only to the soldier, but also to their immediate family and friends. When this invitation
was accepted, it allowed me to share a meal with the veteran and his partner, and to check
before I left the next morning that the narrator had had a good night’s sleep. Meetings took
far longer than veterans realised they would. As the interview proceeded, the veteran tended
to become more engaged and more forthcoming.

Not all the narrations occurred in the narrator’s home. Two of the interviews were conducted
in clubs rather than in the veterans’ homes. Three other interviews were conducted in the
sound laboratory at the AWM as the result of a request from the AWM’s oral history unit to
provide them with radio broadcast quality tapes. The AWM provided a sound engineer to
handle all the recording details, leaving me to concentrate on the interview.
5. Rosie Block of the NSW Oral History Association of Australia made this suggestion among a number of helpful pieces of
advice.
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Before each interview I alerted the narrator to the fact that the interview might give rise to
feelings that could require professional assistance.

6

There was also a need to reassure wives

and partners, because they knew the potential trauma that talking about Vietnam sometimes
caused their partners. A number gave details of their current support arrangements and the
level of assistance they had available to them. Each narrator was assured that the narration
could be terminated at any time. A number of the narrators discussed personal issues with
me, and my stock answer was they should seek help from a professional as I was not qualified
to give advice. Most were aware of the Vietnam Veterans’ Counselling Service, and all were
advised how to contact this service should they feel the need to talk with someone.
The fact that I had been there with these men for six months during their service, gave me
particular insights into their lives on the battlefield.
interviewer.

I was in an unusual position for an

I not only knew these people as their commander, I also had the intense

emotional connection of being part of a team. We had not only combined to take life, but we
had also attended to wounded comrades and civilians. My decisions resulted in some of their
comrades/mates losing their lives. I liked to think that platoon members accepted me as one
of their own. I assumed too that there was a common base to our memory of the Vietnam
War, uncontaminated by public and popular memory. The narrators knew that I would not
take the official army position or the more radical position of the anti-war movement. We
had suffered together during the war and continued to suffer from it long after the war ended.
The first obstacle to achieving a worthwhile oral history was that I had to move from a
position of command and absolute authority to one of collaboration.

7

As the interviewer in

control of the narrative, I could ask questions that could lead the narrative in a direction. I
needed to reflect on our past relationship and realise that while I may want to change it, the
8

veterans may not be so inclined. These narratives crossed a number of personal and
psychological boundaries and we were sharing events, incidents, secrets and feelings. It was
new territory for both interviewee and interviewer.

As Paul Thompson comments, the

historian comes to an interview, sits at the feet of others, and learns from those who know
9

more about the subject. Even though, I was of the same age and gender as my narrators, the
situation was contrary to my training at the Royal Military College, where I was taught to be a
leader. I had been indoctrinated that officers do not fraternise with soldiers. I was taught to
6. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 237.
7. Michael Frisch, ‘Sharing authority: Oral history and the collaborative process’, The Oral History Review; Winter 2003, vol. 30,
issue 1, 111-3. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 58-60, 268. Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, xii, 31.
8. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 58-60, 268. Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, xii, 31-2.
9. Thompson, The Voice of The Past, 12.
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be firm and friendly, but not familiar.

In one sense I was interviewing myself as part of the process of getting to the ‘truth’ of the
events of 1967. Clearly there was the danger that I would prioritise my own memory. What I
found was that, like a researcher who leads to a different question than the one he started with,
I was forced to confront the obvious fact that not every one remembered things the way I did.
Information came to light that made me view issues very differently than how I had viewed
them prior to the narratives. On the other hand, it was clear that my status has a former officer
gave permission to at least some soldiers to offer a full and frank account than they might
otherwise had done.
As a participant interviewer, I had to be alert to the danger of my story becoming their story.
Portelli has noted that the oral historian becomes in effect the co-creator of the narrator’s
testimony. Without my urging, the soldier’s narrative would never have been produced. On
the other hand, my presence was bound to have an effect, both positive and negative, on the
narration itself. In the pre-taping period, it seemed as though we had returned to 1967, and I
was still the authority figure. Platoon members mostly asked what I wanted them to say.
Portelli has described how some oral history interviewees require a mandate from the
interviewer, often wanting to tell the interviewer what he wants to hear.

10

Once given

‘permission to speak’, and even though there was often some initial awkwardness, all
narrators quickly became comfortable in their role.

11

I made it clear that I was looking for private memory. They had permission to tell their story
warts and all, that I was conducting research, not a witch-hunt over past events. I had to get
past the grooming that the Army did in its training, with its implicit sanction around talking
about certain issues, feelings and personal observations.

12

The provisions of the Official

Secrets Act arose on occasions, although this was no longer relevant in terms of the soldier’s
testimony. I also had to revisit the consent form and its purpose to be sure that narrators
understood that it gave the Australian War Memorial and interested researchers access to their
taped interviews. Here, informed consent became an issue as some of the narrators said to
me: ‘you know what to cut out’. I had to respond that they could ask for testimony to be

10. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, 9.
11. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 9.
12. This issue is discussed in the section on oral history.
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removed, but that I would not edit their tapes in any way. Thomson reports the request of his
13

narrators to be either ‘off the record’ or totally anonymous. This raises questions as to why
veterans feel the need for such anonymity, and what informs former soldiers’ opinions about
what is and is not acceptable for the history record. One narrator in this research gave a
detailed oral history but made it clear that I was never to use any names. I was left wondering
whether the narrator did not want to stand by his testimony or was fearful that it might be
used against him or the Army. The chronological flow method as outlined in Thomson’s
book ANZAC Memories, was used to conduct the narrative.

14

To get the interview started,

and to guide my questions along a chronological sequence, a questionnaire (Appendix 2)
was prepared.

15

My list of questions was similar in structure to those used by Gary McKay in

an annex to Fragments of Vietnam.

16

I began with the open-ended question: ‘Where did you join the Army?’

Some needed no

more encouragement than that. If the narrator stopped, I was able to offer a question, which
returned them to the narrative. At times the narrative became a dialogue where both the
narrator and interviewer returned to the past.
There were breaks in the narrations. For some, I was the first person they had talked to in any
detail about their war.

17

There were long pauses, and it was difficult not to fill up the space

with questions to move the interview along.

After relating the details of a M16 mine

exploding among the platoon, one narrator broke the silence with the plea; ‘Say something,
Ben Morris’.

18

Most interviews had to be halted at some stage for the veteran to regain his

composure. Sometimes family members provided light refreshment or meals. When the
interview resumed, playing the last words recorded helped to re-establish our place in the
narration. I do not think that these breaks hindered the narration; perhaps they enhanced
it. The veteran sometimes wished to continue with the tape recorder turned off. During
the breaks I kept the conversation to topics already discussed or guided the conversation to
subjects removed from the war.

My narrators and I entered into an area of memory to which others are often not admitted,
including close family members. It is well established in the literature that veterans

13. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 231.
14. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 239.
15. University of Wollongong, Ethics Approval HE09/015, 2 February 2009.
16. McKay, Fragments of Vietnam, 281-8.
17. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 233.
18. Ross Horne, interview by Ben Morris, tape and transcript held by author, Lugarno, 25 September 2004.
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often prefer to share memories with other veterans or unrelated benevolent
witness and not with close family.

19

It should be noted that veterans’ reunions do not

consist of discussing grisly details about the war.

Rather, veterans tend to focus upon

remembering the dead and checking up on the living.

Nonetheless, when asked to

remember certain events, few have difficulty remembering their wartime activities.

The

memories of these soldiers, especially memories about traumatic events, were remarkably
consistent and yielded important information not available in other sources.

I taped until the veteran ran out of words.

Often I was more exhausted than the

narrator, the majority of whom seemed to revel in the act of remembering.

20

Even those

who claimed their memory was deficient were usually able to add to the record, sometimes
with information that others had discarded. One of my narrators makes the observation:
But there’s other things you remember, and they can be minute detail (sic)
where no one else would remember, but to you they’re actually in your
memory and you’ll take them to the grave with you. Then there might be
something else that someone else thinks is quite important and you’ve
completely forgotten about it. That can happen. It’s unpredictable.

21

22

This narrator claims that some things are just stuck in his memory:

37 years. All of that should be fading, you know. I can’t remember what
bars I drank in in Australia 37 years ago but I remember what I’d done in
November 1967 and other times because that’s why probably we’re on TPI
(Totally and Permanently Incapacitated), because all of those memories keep
coming back.

They’re not allowed to fade, like a lot of the other

memories. The pictures keep coming back, maybe in some people maybe
once a week; some people maybe once a month.

But quite regularly, so

they don’t fade. They don’t get dim. But after 37 years – I aah... I still
remember ... Just minute things.

23

Transcripts were made of all recordings. There were caveats placed on three recordings. One
narrator asked that their transcript be re-written, as they were appalled by the grammar of

19. Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 189-94, 212, 244-9.
20. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 226.
21. Brian Heath, interview by Ben Morris, tape and transcript held by author, Banksia Beach, 20/12/04.
22. Heath, interview.
23. Heath, interview.
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their spoken English. It was pointed out that this was oral history, with the accent on ‘oral’,
and the interview was not a grammar examination. The narrator was invited to correct
spelling mistakes, and that is where any correcting of the text finished. Three individuals
assisted me with transcribing the tapes and each found it difficult to write down all of what
was said. The problems tended to arise when the narrators came to an emotionally traumatic
event when two things occurred simultaneously. Firstly, the narrator lowered his voice and
secondly, he lapsed into army slang from the mid-1960s. This was a mixture of Australian
Army jargon, Army argot, the language of Americans serving in Vietnam, and Armed
Forces Radio Saigon speak.

Some offered to bring diaries, notebooks and published books to help them to remember. My
reply was I was interested in their unaided memory - I wished to get away from the recorded
public memory, and into the individual’s private memory. Dates, grid references and reports
of incidents could be checked separately. The narrator’s memory was what I was seeking. At
least one of those who said they had nothing to say was eventually able to provide 16 to 17
typewritten pages of narrative, which added immensely to the information yielded in the
24

interviews. I had to resist ‘correcting’ narratives on occasions, when my recollection differed
from that of the narrator.

25

I was seeking the narrator’s experience not their affirmation or

confirmation of my own version of history.

26

I had to remember that my narrators were not

only reporting ‘facts’, but also evaluating the events of the late 1960s through the lens of the
present while talking about their actions on the battlefield. It is clear that veterans can tailor
their memories according to the audience they are addressing. One of my narrators made a
contribution to the book Just A Nasho, in which he is very positive about his wartime
experience.

27

In the book, he focused upon two incidents, which seemed to confirm the

ANZAC/digger legend and he left out the problematic and perplexing aspects of his tour. Yet
he shared with me his memory of the dark side of fighting an insurgency because he felt
that he had the necessary ‘permission to speak’ about these events.

The percentage of time a veteran devoted to discussing an incident was an indication of its
importance to him, and it may also be a reflection of its importance to the interviewer. The
participant interviewer can, through his questions, manipulate the answers to suit his own version of

24. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, viii, 9.
25. Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, ix, 2, 50-8. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 31. Valerie Yow, Recording
Oral History A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences Second Edition, Altamira, Walnut Creek, 2005, 157-79.
26. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Guilia, 55.
27. Ross Horne, interview by Ben Morris.
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events. There is the danger that, by asking ‘leading’ questions, the interviewer will hear only what
he wants or expects to hear. By careful analysis of the memory that has been recorded by this
interview method, a better understanding of events may be obtained.

28

Information can arise that

the interviewer is not aware of, but which may shed light on the events themselves.

My interviews differed from those Thomson conducted with veterans of World War One.
Firstly, I was a contemporary of my narrators.

We had formed a relationship on the

battlefield some forty years prior to this research commencing. They knew that my memory
did not conform to the popular memory of the Vietnam War.

A number of narrators, for

example, mentioned that they sensed a tension between the company commander and myself.
They saw its manifestations in a number of ways. To them, the principal evidence of this was
the amount of time our platoon spent on patrol. At reunions and other meetings they had
provoked me about some incidents, which had occurred. They knew that I had trouble with
some aspects of the recorded battalion history.

Traumatic events stood out in the memories of my narrators.

The five incidents which

prompted the most discussion were: an ambush resulting in the death of five civilians; what
may have been a suicide attempt by a platoon member; a landmine accident resulting in the
death of two soldiers; a ‘claymore’ booby trap explosion causing the death of two soldiers and
wounding of seven other soldiers; and the shooting of a friendly sentry.

The most frequently discussed event unprompted by a question concerned the platoon
member who was fatally wounded by a mine and whose wounds were wrongly reported in the
history books. Everyone who was present was affected by the incident, and they all tell their
part in moving the wounded man from the danger area to the helicopter-landing zone. A
number of the men cried at various times when talking about this particular incident. The
soldier was a re-enforcement, and had come to the Battalion three months after it had arrived
in Vietnam. He had not been involved in the work-up exercises, or the initial shake-down
operations in country. He was a non-drinker, and thus did not partake in the usual activities in
the soldier’s canteen. However, he was always available for the first stint on sentry duty, so
the others could go and have a drink after returning from operations.

As one member

described him, he was a gentleman. In many ways, he was the antithesis of a digger; he

28. Robertson, Oral History Handbook.
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didn’t drink, he didn’t swear and he was amenable to authority. He constituted a sharp
contrast to the rest of the platoon. Yet in their narratives, they show a very high level of
respect for him, and each tells a different part of the process in their attending to his
wounds and moving him to the medical evacuation helicopter pick-up point.

Everyone

knew he wasn’t going to survive the wounds that had been inflicted by the mine. The
whole platoon was in shock over the extent of his injuries and his pain.

How they

remembered his pain varied. Some, including myself, recalled the wounded man as being
very stoic and quiet despite the pain. One remembers him screaming in pain and shock. We
all recalled his courage. He was at first glance the least likely ‘digger’ hero, but, in the
platoon’s view, was the most deserving to be honoured in that way.

While the wounding and subsequent death of this soldier was a traumatic event, it was safely
inside the parameters of the ANZAC/digger legend. On the other hand, there was reluctance
on the part of some veterans to discuss the ambush that resulted in the killing of civilians. I
concluded that this was because some platoon members did not want to reignite my own
traumatic memories of these events. One soldier initially refused to discuss the ambush but
then changed his mind:
I’d like to backtrack. There was a question that Ben asked me earlier about
the civvies ambush, and I said to him at the time ‘I’m not going to talk
about it.’ The reason I didn’t want to talk about it was it affected Ben
badly, and I didn’t want to offend him, so therefore I said to him ‘I’m not
going to talk about it.’ I’ve thought about it since, spoken to Ben about it,
and I’ll now speak about it because quite frankly I don’t believe that we
29

were in the wrong.

Ultimately, I was glad that I had pressed my narrators to open up about a traumatic event that
they would not have spoken to anyone else about on or off the record. Whether risking their
psychological wellbeing for the sake of a potentially more accurate history was the right thing
to do still troubles me.

In the end, however, many soldiers’ voices that would never

have been heard are now available to the public. The narrators tell me that they are happy
that this is the case.

The death of Pettitt deeply affected all members of the platoon. Their precise memory of this

29. Diego, interview, by author Ben Morris, name withheld tape and transcript held by author, date and location withheld.
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event confirms the literature suggests that traumatic events remain deeply imprinted.

30

Their

strong objection to the mistaken account of Pettitt’s wounds in the official history supports the
notion that soldiers are deeply sceptical about any official Army history. This was one case
where getting the facts wrong added to the trauma of the survivors and is a powerful argument
for having the soldiers’ view incorporated in the official histories.

30. Nadel Lynn and Jacobs W. Jake ‘Traumatic Memory Is Special’, Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 7, no. 5,
October, 1998, 154-7.
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CHAPTER THREE: VIETNAM AND
CIVILIAN DEATHS
For various reasons, the Vietnam War has given birth to a literature that is almost as
conflicted and controversial as the war itself. Many books published in the United States and
Australia continue to debate whether this was a ‘just’ or ‘necessary’ war, why the Americans
became bogged down in a quagmire, whether the media turned the public against the war,
whether better tactics or stronger political resolve could have won the war, and whether or
not the United States was successful in winning Vietnamese ‘hearts and minds’.
In the United States, journalists who opposed the war have written the best-selling books
1

about the Vietnam War. Halberstam, Karnow and Sheehan agreed that the United States had
misunderstood the Indo-Chinese context, using the lens of an international Communist
conspiracy when in fact the United States had supported the losing side in a civil
war. According to these writers, the North Vietnamese Communists were nationalists
opposed to the Chinese government and the Americans. Meanwhile, the government of
South Vietnam was a weak ally, corrupt and isolated from the rural population. American
military strategy and tactics have been widely criticised. The criticisms have been directed at
the forced relocation of Vietnamese villages, Lyndon Johnson’s Americanisation of the war,
the American tactics of strategic bombing, the use of napalm, and the bombing of
North Vietnam.

2

In other words, heavy-handed American tactics fatally undermined

whatever chance there was of winning sufficient Vietnamese ‘hearts and minds’ to succeed in
the war.

There are also books arguing that the Vietnam War could have or should have been won.

3

Some recent accounts rehabilitate the ‘Domino Theory’, that is, the idea that Vietnam had to
be defended because of the danger of the spread of Communism to neighbouring countries.

4

1. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, Random House, New York, 1972. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, Viking
Press, New York, 1983. Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, Random House, New
York, 1988.
2. Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanisation of the War in Vietnam, Norton, New York, 1982. George Mc Kahin,
Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam, Knop, New York, 1986. Loren Baritz, Backfire, A History of How
American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the War We Did, William Morrow, New York, 1985. James
William Gibson, The Perfect War, Technowar in Vietnam, Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1986.
3. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam, Frank Cass, London, 2002. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, The
Vietnam War, 1954-1965, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006. Lewis Sorley, A Better War, The Unexamined
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Viewed from that perspective, Vietnam may have been a tactical defeat for the West but was
part of its strategic victory over Communism.

The ‘dominoes’ of Thailand, Indonesia,

Malaysia never did fall to the Communists whose southward advance was delayed for two
decades in the jungles of Vietnam.

5

Just as controversial is the question of the conduct of the Americans and their allies during the
war. In the United States, arguably the single most important component of public memory
6

of the Vietnam War was the My Lai massacre. After Time magazine published its story and
pictures of My Lai, ‘a majority of Americans came to believe that their fellow Americans
routinely gathered up women and children and killed them’ and some veterans have offered
gruesome testimony to support this view.

7

Surveying the American literature about the

Vietnam War, Kulik makes the point that ‘much of the commentary and scholarship on the
war remains locked in positions formed long ago. Atrocities are the litmus test that continues
to divide us - how pervasive were they? Whose fault were they?’

8

In a guerrilla war

fought against a mostly un-uniformed enemy, it was always difficult to distinguish between
enemy and civilians. American planes bombed the wrong targets or even the right targets
and civilians died.

The early books on Australia’s involvement in Vietnam tended to be written by journalists
attached to the Australian forces writing books on their return to Australia or unit histories
produced as mementoes for the soldiers of the unit particularly the separating National
Servicemen. Over the next forty years, a number of comprehensive accounts of the war and
Australia’s involvement emerged: Frost, Ross, Maddock, Ham, Grey, Albinski, Withers,
King, Edwards, Murphy, Davies and McKay all made important contributions.

9

The

Commonwealth Government has sponsored the publication of an Official History series
detailing Australia's involvement.

10

Individual units have had histories written about them,

and individual soldiers have become authors and published, in some cases prolifically, on the
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events of the Vietnam battlefield. It would be fair to say that accounts written in the 1970’s
and 80’s tended criticise the Australian involvement. More recently, especially after the
collapse of communism Australia’s involvement in Vietnam has been viewed in a more
positive light.

Much of the controversy in the Australian literature is at the level of high politics. Murphy
and Ham, for example, agree that the Vietnam War was poorly conducted by the American
military and most likely unwinnable from the start.

11

McKay and Davies’ account is an

example of an argument that the war was won because Communism did not spread beyond
Indochina.

12

As late as 2010, Grey still argued that much of what has been written about the

Vietnam War distorts and conceals as much as it explains.

13

Michael Caulfield, for example,

notes that in Vietnam, just like in World War One, the Australians in Vietnam offered
support to a foreign ally and suffered from the futility of following an unsuccessful strategy
devised by Australia’s allies.

14

Grey writes that an overarching myth of Australian military

history is that Australia always fights ‘other peoples’ wars’.

15

In reality, Australia has often

used war as a means to advance what it perceived to be its national interests.

16

Grey notes the undue attention that has been paid to the large numbers of anti-Vietnam War
protesters involved in the three big moratorium marches of 1970–71.

17

In Grey’s view, the

moratorium marches gave birth to the myth that antiwar activism was universally subscribed
to despite figures that suggest that a large proportion of the population did not support the
more radical demands of the marchers.

18

Supporting Grey’s assertion is that in the 1966

election, which was fought on the issue of commitment of troops to Vietnam, the Coalition
Parties under Harold Holt achieved an overwhelming victory.

19

It was not until 1969 that the

public mood began to move decisively against the Vietnam War. Grey also describes as myth
the stereotype of the typical Vietnam Veteran was a soldier suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder, and the popular Hollywood portrayal of the veteran, as an angry man ready to
unleash extreme violence in a homicidal rage on an uncomprehending civilian world.

20

Ham
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is most savage when it comes to the radical opponents of the war, describing as treachery the
activist groups that raised money to support the Communist government in North Vietnam.
Davies and Mackay chide the Vietnam protestors as often naïve and sometimes willing dupes
of a world-wide Communist movement.

Among the veterans who have written about Vietnam War, the most prolific is Gary McKay.
McKay served in Vietnam as a platoon commander, and experienced the casualty evacuation
system when he was wounded in the last Australian battle of the war.

21

He has written on

aspects of the Vietnam War as diverse as Long Tan, SAS, the Army Training Team, the
support services and returning to the battlefield.

McKay has written two books with an

Australian War Memorial staff member, while four others were written with fellow
veterans.

22

McKay wants the public to understand the war from the soldiers’ perspective.

According to McKay his narrators did not mention the Communist threat and that mateship
rather than politics was their motivation.

23

In terms of military history, the mosaic is well drawn together by David Horner and Jean Bou
in Duty First, A History of the Royal Australian Regiment.

However there is additional

information covered in the unit histories that fails to make Horner’s omnibus history.

24

Sixteen battalions deployed to South Vietnam and each deployment produced its own
battalion history.

25

Each battalion had at least two histories produced. The Third and Sixth

Battalions produced the most unit histories. These battalion histories range from a simple
pictorial record to a detailed academic history.

26

Initially, a unit history was produced by the

battalion staff with the principal aim of creating a record and memento for the soldiers of the
battalion. For a substantial minority of unit members, the end of the Vietnam tour was the
end of their conscription obligation and a return to civilian life. These unit histories were
produced in the immediate period at the conclusion of the tour. Some of these unit histories
tended to be a cut and paste of operation orders, directions to the battalion, after action reports

21. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 234.
22. Gary McKay and Elizabeth Stewart, Viet Nam shots: a photographic account of Australians at war, Allen & Unwin, Crows
Nest, 2006. Gary McKay and Elizabeth Stewart, With Healing Hands, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003.
23. McKay, Fragments of Vietnam, 4.
24. Horner and Bou, Duty First.
25. Http://rarcorporation.com/category/history/bibliography/ last accessed 11/03/2014.
26. Kevin Eugene Newman, The ANZAC Battalion, A Record of the Tour of 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1st
Battalion, the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (The ANZAC Battalion) in South Vietnam, 1967-68, Printcraft Press,
Brookvale NSW, 1968. Robert A. Hall, Combat Battalion, The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards,
2000.

37

and the soldiers newsletter supplemented by a detailed nominal roll of all members. The rolls
usually included details of wounded and members killed in action. The information of the
killed in action is normally featured in early part of the history. Remembrance is a principal
part of this genre of unit history. These unit histories do not claim to be impartial but
represent important sources: a number of the unit histories’ authors went on to t a k e u p
senior positions within the Department of Defence.

27

One author became a Minister of the Crown, while others became prominent academics.
Eight of the unit histories incorporate the term ‘ANZAC’ into their title. Other titles include
references to regimental traditions and include references to regimental mottos, colours and
mascots. While the quality of the books varies greatly, they all include part of the history of
the Royal Australian Regiment while deployed in the Vietnam theatre.

Yet while the official histories and the popular histories tend to rehabilitate the Vietnam War
and its soldiers, they all agree that many strategic and tactical errors were made.

The

Australian literature usually takes the view that Australian soldiers fought well, but were let
down in the end by a flawed strategy and tactics of the American, and to some extent, the
Australian commanders.

28

This literature mostly supports what is referred to as the

ANZAC and digger legends.

ANZAC AND DIGGER
Nearly all political units have weaved myths and legends around their warriors. Jane Ross
has written that a myth is a legend that is built up as an ideal-type, created out of what the
mythmakers believe to be the most important part of the legend.

29

Seal defines ‘myth’ as an

understood belief-structure, which is fundamentally embedded in a society and its culture. He
goes on to write that a myth can be ‘true’, or appearing to be so, and ‘false’, in the sense that
it hides, disguises, or distorts (by sanitisation or enhancement), ignores or trivialises aspects
of our experience. Australians prefer an image of their soldiers that emphasises their military
prowess and their disrespect for pompous officers. Historians such as Inglis, Smith, Seal,
Thomson, Crotty, Stockings, Gammage, Fewster, White and others have probed the ANZAC
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tradition to reveal how important the image of the ANZAC has been in shaping a national
identity.

30

The ANZAC tradition has often been criticized for romanticizing war and leaving

out the war crimes, atrocities, cowardice, and broken lives.

31

The more positive image of

32

ANZAC predominates in popular films and books. According to Fussell, World War One
was an era that the public was reassured by war being presented as 'wholesome fun'.

33

The

biggest contributor to the ANZAC tradition was Charles Bean, a journalist for the Sydney
Morning Herald who won a competition to become Australia’s official war correspondent at
Gallipoli. His reports from the battlefields of World War One established the template for
Australian military history.

34

Bean based the ANZAC Legend on the stories and myths of the

Australian bush.

Bean already had in his mind that the Australian bushman would prove himself a superior
soldier when tested in the battles of the Great War.
confirmed his preconception.

35

Bean’s observations of Gallipoli

Most newspaper reports, pamphlets and books that emerged

amid the fighting in 1914-18 were to be written with the ANZAC legend in mind, and are
heavily romanticised. As Thomson expressed it:
The Australian soldier of the legend was enterprising and independent,
loyal to his mates and to his country, bold in battle, but cheerfully
undisciplined out of the line and contemptuous of military etiquette
and

the

British

officer

class.

The Australian Army suited his

egalitarian nature: relations between officers and other ranks were friendly
and respectful, and any man with ability could gain promotion.
According
Australian

to

the

legend

these

qualities,

fostered

in

the

bush, discovered and immortalised in war, typified

Australians and Australian society, a frontier land of equal opportunity in
which enterprising people could make good. This was the nation that
'came of age' at Gallipoli.
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Participants often want to tell their story in a way that positions their own experience within
37

this ANZAC tradition or its popular counterpart, the ‘digger’. The oral history surrounding
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War has to be understood in the light of the ANZAC
and digger myths. Two case studies will help to make this point. It would be fair to say that
most members of my platoon saw themselves as part of the ANZAC tradition.

Some

narrators began by positioning their service within the ANZAC legend by talking about their
grandfathers, great uncles, fathers and uncles who had served in the World Wars, Korea, and
other conflicts. 2 RAR was the first Battalion in the Vietnam War to be integrated with New
Zealand infantry soldiers. In Inventing ANZAC, Graham Seal places the Vietnam Veteran
within the ANZAC tradition; Thomson makes a similar comment in ANZAC Memories.

38

Reference to the Vietnam Veteran as part of the ANZAC legend is ubiquitous in books about
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War.

39

The strength of the legend is reflected in what

seems to me to be one of the great myths of Vietnam – that the Australians who fought in
Vietnam chose to do so.

CASE STUDY ONE: VOLUNTEERING FOR VIETNAM
One of the things that struck me as I interviewed veterans of my platoon was how often they
described themselves as having volunteered for Vietnam. The relevant legislation affecting
the national service was the National Service Act 1964 and the Defence Act 1965.

40

which

applied to both regular and national servicemen; it did not provide for volunteers. Regular
soldiers and national servicemen, once enlisted into the Army, were obliged by law to serve
where the army required them to do so. Why do so many veterans, including the veterans of
my platoon, prefer to describe themselves as volunteers?

One possible reason is that it

increases the prestige of Vietnam veterans if they can claim that they were volunteers just like
those who went to the heroic, nation-building battles of World War One. It is much more
heroic to have chosen to become a warrior; the Australian soldiers at Gallipoli were all
volunteers.

Ham states that the great myth of conscription was that national servicemen conscripts were
forced to serve in Vietnam.

41

Or, as another writer, put it, ‘Soldiers could opt out and
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compete their National Service at home in Australia if their unit was assigned to Vietnam’.

42

Jane Ross makes the claim that there was never any shortage of soldiers wanting a posting to
Vietnam, so everyone who went was a volunteer.

43

Ham quotes correspondence from

Brigadier Colin Khan to David Horner, editor of Duty First, saying that conscripts had to
volunteer to serve overseas.
or verbally.

44

Ham suggests that this volunteering occurred either in writing

The verbal consent may have amounted to saying nothing as a sergeant

articulated his contempt for any unpatriotic individual who did not want to go to Vietnam.

45

In Duty First, Colonel John Healey, a former Director of Infantry, writes about signing a form
to avoid service in Vietnam, although he gives no confirming authority, reference or sample.
The 3 RAR Unit History claims during corps training national servicemen willing to go to
Vietnam signed a form to that effect.
preparing for deployment.

46

Healey states that the form was a normal part of

47

Service organisations officially maintain that every person who went was a volunteer,
and the great majority of veterans agree.

48

My platoon members were adamant that all

national servicemen who served in Vietnam were volunteers.

49

But in what sense did they

volunteer? And what exactly was the process of volunteering? How certain are the authorities
that only volunteers went to Vietnam?
The ‘volunteering form’ that some former officers have spoken about remains mysterious and
I have not been able to locate it.
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This ‘volunteering’ form has not been found in any

national serviceman’s personal file record that I have encountered in the course of this
research. After my Vietnam service I served in the Third Training Battalion preparing men
for Vietnam and I never saw the form under discussion. The register of Government forms
contains no such form.

51

The National Service Bill presented to Parliament and passed into
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legislation did not set out a procedure for volunteering.

52

So where did the form – mentioned

by many narrators – come from? It may have been the form used in the national service
training of the 1950s when national servicemen were asked to volunteer for overseas service.
It would seem that some battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment may have resurrected
this old form and used it as a record of national servicemen having agreed to serve overseas.

53

Another possible source of confusion may be that Vietnam-era soldiers were given an
opportunity to indicate the battalion they wanted to serve in, with the knowledge of which
battalions were already scheduled for service in Vietnam.

This information was widely

circulated at the Infantry Training Centre and it was passed on to the trainees. My narrators
confirm this point. One de facto method of volunteering was to apply for posting to the 1
Australian Reinforcement Unit (1 ARU) in Vietnam.

In the Training Battalions, there was a form to indicate posting preference by the newly
qualified infantrymen. It was an administrative device to reduce workloads and ministerial
inquiries.

The choice on this form was to either of the two battalions working up for

deployment or the Reinforcement Unit at Ingleburn.

National Service was a highly

contentious issue and often parents kept a close eye of their son’s service experience. The
Army foresaw a possibility that if soldiers were not given a chance to nominate the battalion
in their parent’s residential state then questions would arise for the local member from those
voters to why their son was not posted to the battalion in their state. The choice was not
Vietnam or Australia but which unit was the vehicle for deployment to Vietnam. This created
a false ‘volunteer’ environment and was a pressure reducing strategy. It basically assimilated
the national servicemen into the Army rather than have them feeling they had no choice on
their employment in undertaking national service.

Yet there are veterans who consider that they went to Vietnam against their will. An example
is contained in the testimony of one veteran – not from my platoon – who wrote the following
to me:
I wish to set the record straight.

My name is (omitted).

I was

conscripted in 1969 against my wishes and sent to Vietnam in infantry as a
reinforcement. I did my rookie training at Puckapunual and was forced into
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Infantry training at Singleton.

My choice of corps was RAEME or

Engineers, obviously I did not get my choice.

I was sent to Ingleburn

where I sat for an Assault Pioneer course to delay me getting posted to
Vietnam. On the completion of my course I was asked if I wanted to go to
Vietnam to which I replied no.

They set up three lines on the parade

ground. Line one was for those who volunteered to go to Vietnam straight
away. Line two was volunteers to Vietnam but not straight away. Line
three was for those that did not want to go to Vietnam. I was in line three
and was told that I had to go to line two and could not get out of going to
Vietnam unless I had a brother that was killed in Vietnam. After being at
Ingleburn for six months I was sent to Vietnam as a reinforcement with a
friend of mine. We were eventually sent to 6RAR. We were with 6RAR
for three months, at which time the battalion was sent home. We wanted
to go home with them but were told we had to serve at least six months
in Vietnam before we could go home. We were then transferred to 7RAR
[Name Supplied and withheld] Company.

I was in X Platoon and [my

friend] was in Y Platoon operating out of Fire Support Base Brigitte. [My
friend] was killed as a consequence of a night operation.

Prior to [my

friend] going out on patrol we spoke at length how we both did not want to
be in Vietnam. Unfortunately [my friend] died as a person who did not want
to serve in Vietnam. Obviously this affected me and I spent my
remaining time in Vietnam in constant fear.

54

CASE STUDY TWO: WAR CRIMES, ATROCITIES
and
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Bean deliberately left out ‘the horror and beastliness and cowardice and treachery’ of war.

55

This was typical of the war reporting of his era when it was expected that even the most
conscientious journalists would adopt a patriotic tone. The ANZAC legend tends not to
dwell on the unpleasant side of war – examples of cowardice, the accidental killing of
civilians, and the sad decline of many veterans after their return home. Historians have
noted that often those parts of history that do not fit the publicly acceptable image are
either ignored or hidden. Thomson refers to the battle in Australian military history as
54. Email, name withheld on request, Re: Reference Question on Volunteers for Vietnam, held by author and published with the
veteran’s approval, 5 August 2013.
55. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 60.
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pitting those who are ‘loyalists’ against those who are seen as being ‘disloyal’.
spectre of disloyalty drove the mobilisation for the First World War.

57

56

The

Anyone with any

reservations about World War One was under suspicion of being disloyal to the country,
King and Empire. They belonged to a conspiracy network of enemy sympathisers, anti-war
activists, strikers, shirkers, and Bolsheviks.

58

According to Seal, the military, political and social elites have appropriated parts of the
digger tradition to build a nationalistic/militaristic mythology of great convenience to
themselves and their purposes.

59

Veterans’ memories often challenge these myths or cause a

closer but uncomfortable examination of events. When soldiers’ recollections differ from
what has become the ‘official history’ of the Vietnam War, their memory of events is often
attacked or debunked (sometimes unfairly) so as to preserve the legends and myths.
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The standard line is that the Vietnam veterans upheld the best of the ANZAC tradition. As
one commentator elucidated:

The Australians bent over backwards to help and protect the civilian
population of “their” province, Phuoc Tuy.

Unlike the Americans, with

their tactical reliance on saturation firepower, the Australians employed
tactics based on local intelligence, stealth, patience, jungle craft and targeted
objectives. Their willingness to avoid incurring “collateral damage” amused
the Vietcong.

61

Paul Ham devotes a fair amount of space to the subject of enemy atrocities, but highlights no
Australian atrocities.
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Yet Ham has come in for criticism because his book described how

the South Vietnamese soldiers celebrated the recapture of Hue after the Tet Offensive of 1968
by hanging enemy corpses on the city walls. For Bruce Davies, this was an uncorroborated
claim and an inaccurate account of the battle that taints the military reputation of South
Vietnam’s allies.
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How much evidence is there that Australian soldiers committed war crimes and were they a
‘normal’ part of how Australia fought the Vietnam War? What Ham, Davis and McKay
either avoid altogether or dismiss are allegations of war crimes and atrocities made by
Australian soldiers about their deployment to Vietnam. Yet Ham and Ian McNeil in the
official history To Long Tan, both report that two live enemy casualties were shot dead after
the Long Tan Battle; participant Sergeant Bob Buick confirms this.
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Caulfield acknowledges

the so-called ‘mercy killings’ at Long Tan but does not view these as a war crime.

65

This is

troubling because medical opinion then and now suggests that if an enemy casualty can
survive the night on the battlefield, no matter how terrible their individual injuries might
appear, they could respond to medical treatment.

66

Vietnamese sources accused Australian soldiers of beheading and disembowelling enemy
casualties. Maddock, who has investigated these claims, concluded that:
The Australian did expose corpses, though probably not very often.

It

is highly unlikely, in my opinion that they took heads or livers, but it is
easy to see how a belief that they did could arise.

Arbitrary arrests and

wanton killings could be logical interpretations by one side of the actions
that the Australians might see in a quite different light.

Because vicious

fighting sometimes occurred in villages, it is almost certain that some
genuine non-combatants got killed. What one side regretted as unintended
civilian casualties might well be seen less charitably by the other as a
slaughter of the innocent.

67

It is these ‘unintended civilian casualties’ that are most difficult for historians and veterans to
write about. For those who wish to portray Australian soldiers as an exemplary fighter, the
killing of civilians is an inconvenient truth. For those who prefer to view the war through the
prism of war crimes and atrocities, ‘unintended civilian casualties’ are often used as examples
of a war that had lost its moral compass.

The case against the Australian soldier is made in Rintoul’s Ashes of Vietnam and Burstall’s A

64. Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, 244. Burstall, Soldiers Story, 137-41. Ian McNeill, To Long Tan, The Australian Army
and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1993, 344. Robert S Buick, Letter to the Long Tan
Association Newsletter, 27 August 2000.
65. Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 319.
66. Email, Rod Bain to Ben Morris, Wounded Enemy at Long Tan, Monday, 7 October 2013.
67. Maddock, Memories of Vietnam, 158, 159.
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Soldier’s Story and A Soldier Returns.

68

Rintoul interviewed over two hundred veterans and

quotes more than one hundred in his book.

69

Rintoul’s collection of oral testimony suggests

that Australian soldiers routinely committed atrocities involving the killing of unarmed
civilians, particularly women and children, raping of women, and failure to observe the
Geneva Conventions on the handling of prisoners of war. 70 What might be described as lesser
crimes involved the mishandling of dead bodies. 71 Rintoul suggests that atrocities were very
much part of the Australian Vietnam experience; about one quarter of his narrators mention
them. 72 But Rintoul does not make it easy to check his sources; those that spoke of atrocities
are identifiable only by their first name making any form of checking impossible.

The Battle of Binh Ba in June 1969 is an example. For the Australian Army, Binh Ba ranks
as one of the major Australian victories of the war. The Royal Australian Regiment, First
Armoured Regiment and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment were subsequently awarded the battle
honour 'Binh Ba', one of only five awarded to Australian units during the war. 73 With the aid
of armoured support, Australian soldiers fought their adversary house by house in the village.
Rintoul offers the testimony of Sergeant Brian London, a regular soldier who did two tours of
duty and who was awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his actions at Binh Ba. He
gives his full name and details and reports the Battle of Binh Ba as follows:

It went on for two days. We'd go through one end of the village, take
up defensive positions for the night and then sweep back through it again at first
light the next day. We'd got most of them that were in there. They were
identified as a North Vietnamese regiment. The body-count for my platoon
was about twenty. I only found one dead civilian. I saw an old woman who
was down in a little shelter. It was open, blown apart at one end. It
obviously had received a direct hit by some heavy- calibre weapon. I told her
to come out, that we weren't going to hurt her, I couldn't speak
Vietnamese, only the essential words that were needed to know, but I
eventually coaxed her out and she was quite distraught. There was a body a child's body - still in the bunker.

68. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam. Maddock, Memories of Vietnam, 1991. Burstall, A Soldier Returns, 150-84. Burstall, Vietnam: The
Australian Dilemma, 96-106. Don Tate, ANZACs Betrayed, warvet_69@yahoo.com, Murdoch Books, Millers Point 2013.
Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 319.
69. Email, Stuart Rintoul to Ben Morris, Re Research at UOW- Ashes of Vietnam, March 2013.
70. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 78, 83, 100, 115, 129, 144, 147, 148, 154, 166, 176. Email, Graham Walker to Ben Morris, RE:
Second and Third References, 8 November 2011. Email, Graham Walker to Ben Morris, RE: Second and Third References, 9
November 2011.
71. Portellii, The Battle of Valle Giulia, 170. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 42, 48, 63, 65, 76, 108, 128.
72. Discussion with Graham Walker, 24 May 2010. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam 112.
73. Horner, Duty First, 219.
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But elsewhere Rintoul’s narrators describe the Battle of Binh Ba contact as a ‘massacre’. 74
One narrator recounts his experience at Binh Ba, clearing house to house, in the course of
which, he believes, there were ‘a lot of innocent people killed’.

Ric (no last name or

identifying information) described Binh Ba as follows:
It was a massacre, it really was. But those people were warned; they were
told to get out, but they wouldn't leave. It was house to house. You'd throw
in a couple of grenades, give it a burst with the machine-gun, then you'd
look for trapdoors and, again, it was just blat with the gun. I cracked up
after then, just dropped everything, I was that frightened of losing my life.
Some hundred and twenty nogs were killed there…75
The impression from Ric’s narrative is that many civilians had refused to leave and had ended
up as victims of a massacre. London described a battle in which a North Vietnamese
regiment was routed. According to London’s account, civilian casualties were few and he
personally only saw a single dead child. Should we accept London’s account because he is
willing to identify himself? Or was he as a regular soldier, officer and hero of the battle
protecting his and his fellow soldiers’ reputation by turning a civilian massacre into a hardwon fire-fight with the enemy?

Another of Rintoul’s narrators, Michael, makes claims about Australian raping and killing
villagers, using the ears of dead enemies for necklaces and the shooting of wounded prisoners
that is eerily reminiscent of the American literature, especially Bloods. 76

One veteran

described how an armoured personnel carrier driver decided in a rubber plantation to take
pleasure in running over Vietcong. Another veteran tells of APC gunner shooting a woman
who was trying to surrender. `Chieu hoi’ was the term for surrender and this woman
called out these words. The gunner responded with the following words, ‘`Chew lead,
bitch' and shot her dead. Another of Rintoul’s narrators reported that he saw a New Zealand
soldier drop a grenade into traffic and yell `Ambush.' A couple of civilians were killed and
the perpetrator made out that it was an error. 77 Another veteran tells of three Vietcong being
thrown out of a chopper, with the narrator claiming to be an eyewitness to this event.78 Each
of these gripping and horrifying anecdotes echoes unreliable stories that appear in Bloods and
Nam. 79
74. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 124.
75. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 129.
76. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 147, 166.
77. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 116, 122.
78. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 130. Terry, Bloods, 27, 254.
79. Baker, Nam. Terry, Bloods.
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Another of Rintoul’s narrators talks about ‘fudging the numbers on body counts’ making it
easier for enemy ‘Wounded in Action’ to become ‘Killed in Action’.

80

Ron Eglinton is one of

Rintoul’s narrators who reports accidental killings of civilians in their narratives.

81

This group was told to check out some civilians and the soldiers carrying out this task
detonated a mine.
child.

This mine killed both Australians and two Vietnamese including a

The detonation brought the child’s mother running; she was shot as the soldiers

considered that her vegetable basket might have contained grenades. In a 3 RAR ambush,
two unarmed persons walked into an ambush and a man was killed and a woman wounded.
The couple were not carrying arms. A veteran claims that his platoon commander placed
grenades in their basket of fish and the vegetables and reported on the radio that the couple
carried grenades.

82

They felt justified as they classified the couple as enemy couriers. Further,

Rintoul reports that planting grenades and rifles on the bodies of unarmed civilians was
commonplace.

Grey dismisses Rintoul’s work, claiming that the latter has adopted the American depiction of
the conflict and ended up with a whinging, unhappy victim of the war.

83

What is missing

from this exchange is closer investigation of the narrations and attempts to corroborate claims
with the written sources. It would be foolish to suggest, as some popular accounts imply, that
only the Vietnamese enemy fought outside accepted rules such as those of the
Geneva Conventions. There is still no systematic study of Australian soldiers and the killing
of civilians in Vietnam. For many writers, this is too far removed from the ANZAC tradition
to warrant serious investigation. Instead, the discussion of civilian deaths is mostly left to
accounts such as Rintoul’s, which have the flaws of books such as those of Terry and Baker.
To gather more information, oral history will be vital. What a veteran remembers in part will
depend upon the questions asked.
Much of the literature in this era is written from the author’s personal ideology and political
preconceptions without the writer acknowledging their personal basis. Many recording this
period are long on opinions and short on facts and supporting references. As already noted
some authors have either been deceived by interviewees as in Nam and Bloods or failed to
verify facts as in the case of the On the Offensive reporting of the John Fraser mine incident.

80. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 146, 154.
81. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 64–5.
82. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam, 136.
83. Pierce, Grey, Doyle, Vietnam Days Australia and the Impact of Vietnam, 183.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

A WAR OF AMBUSHES

The second part of the thesis deals with a case study in the difficulties of writing the history
of the Vietnam War. At its heart are the events of 23 October 1967. On that day, half the
members of my platoon were involved in an ambush that resulted in the death of civilians who
had wandered into a restricted zone.

This episode became part of a political tug-of-war

a decade later between supporters and opponents of the Vietnam War. Investigating the
events of that day is one of the concerns of this thesis.

In May 1966 the First Australian Task Force (1 ATF) established a presence in Phouc Tuy
1

Province, based on a hill called Nui Dat. This was part of Operation Hardihood, the aim of
2

which was to provide security to the Task Force as it moved into its base. Throughout the
war, the focus of Australian military effort was securing Phuoc Tuy, which is east of Saigon.

The bulk of my platoon had arrived in Vietnam on 19 May 1967 on board HMAS Sydney.
Two members had arrived on the 8th May to prepare for the arrival of the main body of the
Second Battalion while a number of soldiers, including myself, arrived as reinforcements and
joined the platoon in country. On arrival the platoon occupied a temporary position in the
Sixth Battalion’s lines before their company moved to the Horseshoe feature, a forward fire
support base previously occupied by the Fifth Battalion. The guns deployed were from the
artillery assets of the task force. This placement extended the coverage of artillery fire
support for patrols of the Task Force to allow the patrols to manoeuvre in a wider area than
was the case when the guns were all located at Nui Dat.

The defences of this feature had not been fully developed when Alpha Company with 2
Platoon under its command arrived at the location. The platoon spent six weeks digging
ground, filling sand bags and building bunkers out of the hard volcanic rock. It was hard
work. Besides working on the defences of the feature, they were also involved in many
patrols around the Horseshoe including overnight ambushes outside the perimeter.
Greg Lockhart’s book The Minefield has described how the Australians laid a minefield

1. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 75. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 179-80
2. Robert J. O’Neill, Vietnam Task, Southwood Press, Marrickville NSW, 1968. 29-49.
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around their base only to have the mines stolen and used against them by their
3

Vietnamese opponent. Lockhart and others have laid the blame at the feet of the Task Force
Commander Graham whose dismissive attitude towards the adaptability and ingenuity of the
Vietcong provided the enemy with a supermarket of free mines.

4

It is estimated that

the enemy collected five to eight thousand mines from the Australian minefield, and that
the stolen mines may have caused ten percent of Australian casualties in Vietnam.

5

For

our platoon, this controversy over the minefield became a deeply personal one. While at
the Horseshoe, the platoon could watch the mines going off in the distance as the Viet Cong
used the cover of darkness to lift the mines. One platoon member was fatally wounded by an
exploding mine with terrible wounds to his lower body. Two medical documents showed that
the soldiers’ wounds were inflicted by a M16 mine.

6

It is possible that this mine had been

lifted from our own minefield.

It was only after leaving the Horseshoe that the platoon was involved in what appeared to the
soldiers to be more serious operations. These operations started off very tentatively and the
nervousness did not fade until the third or fourth patrol.

The duration of the operations

extended to a couple of weeks at a time. After that it became a routine of ambushes and local
patrols consisting of three, five, fifteen and thirty-four man patrols. They were involved in
platoon, company, battalion, and task force operations. During this period the platoon
commander who was in charge suffered an injury and was replaced by myself after the
platoon had returned to the Nui Dat base. The platoon had a change of command at a critical
point in their build-up in country.

The routine for the entire twelve months of the platoon’s tour was basically the same. When
soldiers returned from an operation weapons and equipment were cleaned, checked and
repaired, they then changed, and went down to the bar in the late afternoon or early evening.
When in camp there always was maintenance and sandbagging to be done. They regularly
used a makeshift weapons range just outside the wire to their front generally on a daily basis
where they would practice on targets, sometimes they threw grenades, expended the old
ammunition and tested weapons.
As has often been noted, the Vietnam War was different from previous wars as there were no
front lines. Enemy soldiers often lived as part of the local population and wore the same
3. Greg Lockhart, The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007, 98, 99, 100.
4. Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 185. Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 183-90. Lockhart, The Minefield, 174-5.
5. Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 186. Lockhart, The Minefield, xviii, 139.
6. DD Form 893(1Feb 66) Record of Identification signed by Ray Miller. Operational Casualty Study Report Signed by 2146748
Capt Blomley countersigned by 17042 Major P N D White.
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clothes as the local people. They were often only distinguishable after they opened fire or
were caught carrying weapons. As the official history expressed it:
For most Australian soldiers, the experience of the war in Vietnam was
characterised by weeks or months of patrolling, the exhaustion and
discomfort of enduring long periods of searching, lying in ambush in dense
scrub or harbouring in night defensive positions in a merciless climate that
alternated between the stifling humidity of the wet season and the parched
dry season.

Patrolling soldiers faced the hidden danger of mines and

booby traps and the risk of ambushes or sudden contacts with enemy in
well-defended bunkers. Most contacts were brief clashes with a fleeting
enemy who generally withdrew skilfully under cover.

When conditions

suited the enemy, contacts occasionally developed into protracted fire
fights that might last for hours and invariably left Australian soldiers
dead or wounded.

7

During Operation Hardihood, on 17 May 1967, B Company of the American 1st/503rd
8

Battalion was caught in a Vietcong ambush on Hill 72. The ATF declared a restricted area
around their base that denied civilian access to the area.
was known as Line Alpha.

9

The perimeter of the cleared area

10

The reason for denying access to civilians, was to improve the security of the base by
allowing the Australians to fire without fear of wounding or killing civilians, deny the enemy
an opportunity to reconnoitre the approaches to the base area in preparation for an attack on
the Australian base, and prevent the establishment of mortar positions within range of the
camp.

11

The intention of Operation Hardihood was to evacuate all civilians from small

outlying hamlets in the base area and move them into larger villages and nearby towns.

12

The

evacuation of civilians from areas where they had lived and farmed was carried out in
conjunction with the Vietnamese authorities. The villagers were informed of the exclusion
zone around the Nui Dat Base and the resulting restrictions, and were reminded of these new
rules from time to time by various means, including visits from the Australian Civil Affairs
Unit, and by leaflet drops. It was explained that the physical relocation of civilians was for

7. Ekins Ashley with McNeill Ian, Fighting to the Finish, xviii.
8. O’Neill, Vietnam Task, 33.
9. McNeill, To Long Tan, 241.
10. McNeill, To Long Tan, 241-2.
11. Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, 199. O’ Neill, Vietnam Task, 29-30.
12. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 75.
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their own safety. However, they were not compensated for the loss of their farming lands.

13

This economic dislocation and failure to provide adequate cash flow of any description led to
the locals re-entering their lands.

A patrol programme controlled by the Task Force Headquarters allocated patrol tasks to the
resident units to enforce the exclusion zone.

14

Infantry battalions conducted the bulk of the

patrols. The aim was to have at least one patrol moving through the exclusion area at all
times to deny the enemy access.

In addition to the exclusion area, the perimeter of the

Australian base also had an entanglement or fence, further defended by duty pickets from
units when not patrolling, and also machine gun emplacements or bunkers. Local villagers
who demanded access to their lands were sometimes branded as Viet Cong or North
Vietnamese sympathisers.

My own observation was that local loyalties were divided as

villagers attempted to work out which was the stronger side in the conflict.

The enemy would only stand and fight if they thought they had a numerical or tactical
advantage.

15

If the conditions did not suit them, they disappeared quickly when engaged.

16

To counter the enemy’s advantage in guerrilla-style war, the Australians adopted the ambush,
which had worked well in their previous counter-revolutionary warfare experience against
guerrilla fighters on the Malaysian peninsula.

17

An ambush involved the attacking troops

lying in wait for the enemy, allowing them to enter a location before attacking. This usually
took place in an area where there were signs of previous enemy activity or movement. The
ambush, in theory, gave the Australians both the element of surprise, and time to identify
whether they had found friend or foe.
The ambush in Vietnam was not an American or Australian invention. The Vietminh, and
later, the Vietcong, used the ambush with success against both the French and the
Americans.

18

The Australians used the ambush routinely, and practised it continuously.

19

This meant that the procedure could be implemented quickly, quietly and effectively.

In

Vietnam, most soldiers posted to a rifleman’s position in an infantry unit spent some time

13. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 68-72, 96-8. Ekins with McNeill, Fighting to the Finish, 495. O’Neill, Vietnam
Task 30. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, 66, 73, 224.
14. For an example of these patrol programmes, see 1 ATF Rear Patrol Programme For The Period, 200800H Oct to 260800H
Oct 67.
15. English, The Riflemen, 27-8.
16. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 173-4.
17. Counter-revolutionary warfare, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-insurgency. Dept of Defence. Richard Busby, The
Australian Army and the Vietnam war 1962-1972, Development of Australian Army Tactical Doctrine during Vietnam War,
Australia Publishing Canberra, 2002. J M Church, Second to None, 2 RAR as the ANZAC Battalion in Vietnam 1970-71,
Army Doctrine Centre, Mosman NSW, 1995, 27-8. English, The Riflemen, 17, 67.
18. O’Neill, Vietnam Task, 33. McNeill, To Long Tan, 94. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, 147.
19. O’Neill, Vietnam Task, 43-6.
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ambushing.

20

In the familiarisation phase of each battalion’s tour of duty, ambushing was

taught and practised, and became a common procedure throughout their tour.

21

Ambushes

were often carried out inside the exclusion zone defined by Line Alpha, or on the approaches
to Hoa Long, the village, which had one of its entrances a few hundred meters from one of the
gates to the Nui Dat base.
throughout the war.

22

Units of the Task Force continued ambushing in both these areas

23

As local civilians and Vietcong dressed alike, identifying enemy combatants by sight, unless
armed, was impossible. Task Force Headquarters issued ‘Rules of Engagement’, which laid
down procedures that Australian forces were meant to abide by when engaging the enemy.

24

These rules generated much discussion among soldiers conducting any operation including an
ambush. Once an ambush was established, anybody entering the exclusion zone was to be
regarded as enemy.

The fact that those entering the exclusion zone may appear to be

unarmed was not a reason to hold fire; enemy combatants might be dressed as civilians,
might be helped by women and children, or might have conscripted unarmed civilians to
conceal their operations. This was the nature of fighting a guerrilla war.
The first requirement for an ambush was to locate a piece of ground that the enemy was using
and prepare. The ambushers would select fire positions and a ‘killing area’. Ambushing
troops would be stationary and camouflaged in positions where they were able to see the
enemy approach. In this way, they were able to fire their weapons with ease and accuracy.
The soldiers involved in the ambush knew exactly where their fellow platoon members were
and so the possibility of shooting their colleagues was reduced.

Often, the night location of

a group, known as a ‘harbour’, was set up near a track in the hope that the enemy would pass
that way. This would provide an opportunistic ambush rather than a deliberate ambush.

Leaflets and village meetings were supposed to explain to the local people about the curfews
and restricted areas. It meant that if movement was detected in the ‘killing area’, it was
enemy activity and thus a target. An ambush required the ambushers to remain still, quiet and
ready: troops may have had to wait days before the enemy entered the area where the attack
would be launched.

Such inactivity became boring, tiring and stressful.

25

During July,

August and September 1967, the platoon constantly patrolled in the First Australian Task

20. McNeill, To Long Tan, 250. Horner, Duty First, 184.
21. Horner, Duty First, 173-4, 184-6, 215-6, 220-4.
22. Horner, Duty First, 179-80.
23. Clunies-Ross, The Grey Eight in Vietnam, 15-17, 20, 21-4, 28-9, 31, 38, 42-3, 47, 49, 50-3, 69-72, 76-80, 84-5, 90-1,
94, 99, 101, 103-6, 109-14.
24. Church, Second to None, 21, 46, 89.
25. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 232.
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Force’s tactical area of operations. This work was long, tedious and hard. The enemy was
difficult to find and very fleeting contacts were made. There were no enemy killed, nor were
there any members of the platoon killed during these three months; just long tedious patrols
with tension at a high level. Other companies in the Battalion had run into difficulties with
the stolen mines from the Task Force barrier minefield. The threat from mines was constant
and terrifying; one company in particular had suffered numerous casualties from the relocated
mines.

Ambushes did not always go to plan. On the morning of 23 October 1967, at 0736hrs, my
platoon ambushed a group of civilians who had entered the Line Alpha restricted area. 26 In
my after-action report, I reported that the leading figure in the group of civilians suddenly
held aloft a long thin object that he appeared to have been carrying on his back and pointed it
in our direction. At this point, our machine gunner opened fire, followed by the rest of the
ambush party. The ambush resulted in the deaths of five civilians, the wounding of six
others, and the detention of three more. Four died at the scene: one Vietnamese teenager fled
and later died of wounds from the ambush.
The incident was personally traumatising. I recall running towards the victims once I had
called cease-fire. The moment between the machine gun firing on the civilians and hearing
the whimpering of children caught in the gunfire was very short but still remains with
me. I knew instantly on hearing the cries for help that something was very wrong. I ordered
the platoon to ceasefire and ran towards the killing ground to assess the carnage I realised had
taken place. I was confronted with a scene that will haunt me forever. As I moved forward I
think I was inwardly hoping that the residual firing would kill me. Or at least it seems to me
now that I had a death wish at that moment. It is testimony to the training of the men that I
was not hit. Our training had not prepared us for moments like those.
When the platoon returned to base, we learned that the villagers had been looking for bamboo
thus the incident became known as the “Bamboo Pickers” ambush. The army intelligence
unit interrogated the survivors and released them, convinced they were not enemy
combatants. 27 On arrival at the Nui Dat Base, I was asked by my company commander why
the platoon did not carry old enemy weapons to make it appear that the dead civilians were
Vietcong. I was prepared to account for this incident, but to account for civilians as enemy
26. Lieutenant E B Morris, After Action Report, 2 RAR Commander’s Diary, 24 October 1967.
27. AWM95-7-2-45, 2RAR Duty Officer’s Log Sheet, serials 917, 929 and 930.
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kills, was deceitful and undoubtedly illegal.

28

During our discussion, I was instructed as to

how I was to write my report (Appendix 3). My original report was written with a reference
to the conversation about old enemy weapons. This sentence was deleted from the final
report, which I was required to sign.

Medical evacuations were much more effective in Vietnam than in previous wars.
Psychological help for mental health injuries was less in evidence. The soldiers returned to
base and were left to their own devices. Alcohol was not supposed to be available to soldiers
on duty, but was freely available at the base. On the night after the ambush, back in the Nui
Dat camp, Cisco became intoxicated and - whether by accident or design is unclear - pulled
the pins from each of two hand grenades that he was carrying. Cisco survived but his injuries
included the loss of an arm and a hand. Cisco returned to Australia. The platoon except for
one member, never saw him again as he died, suicided, it appears, four years after leaving
Vietnam.

29

At veterans’ reunions, the ambush was never spoken about. It was a family secret. Upon my
return from Vietnam, I spoke about the incident with my wife, but nobody else. As for the
Army, the lesson it learned was that units in the field should carry more captured enemy
weapons in case of the accidental killing of civilians. My superiors in the chain of command
would remind me of my deficiencies in this area for years to come. These events resurfaced
as a political and media issue a decade later when it was reported that a former deputy Prime
Minister was making allegations of a cover-up of Australia’s own version of the My Lai
massacre.

28. Statutory Declaration, Barry Corse, retired military officer of 2E – 161 Colin Street, West Perth, 6005, dated 25 June 2012.
29. Terence Fogarty, 20100930 Mortality With units(1).xls attachment to email Contact and Help, 8 April 2014 held by author.
http://amvif.com/mortality/ 20140131 Mortality Without Units.xls and 20140131 Mortality With Units.xls.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
A MEDIA ISSUE
DEFENDING THE HONOUR OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

This incident emerged as a media issue nearly a decade later when former Deputy Prime
1

Minister, Dr Jim Cairns, made some startling allegations to the press. On 2 August 1976, Dr
Cairns, the doyen of the left wing of the Australian Labor Party, claimed that Australian
2

soldiers had killed 27 Vietnamese civilians in July 1970. According to Cairns, the Australian
Army had most likely covered up the killings by claiming that the dead were enemy
combatants.
Cairns was a polarising figure in Australian politics. He was the most prominent politician
involved in the anti-war Moratorium movement of 1970-71.

He had a tense political

relationship with Labor Party leader and future Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.

One

biographer described him in the title of his book as a ‘foolish and passionate’ individual.

3

Even his allies would agree about the evidence of passion. While inspecting some burial
mounds in Vietnam, he was approached by a number of farmers. A local farmer, Nguyen
Van Thoi, claimed that the Australians had killed four of his sons.

4

Nguyen Van Thoi

went on to say that three women and a 10-year-old child were among the bodies in the
grave. Cairns heard further claims by Nguyen’s neighbour, Pham Van Thien, who had lost
one son and Pham Thi Tam, who had lost a brother. Mr Thoi wanted compensation,
according to Cairns.

5

Of course, it will come as no surprise to readers fifty years later that civilians died at the
hands of Australian soldiers in Vietnam. This was a hellish war where Australian soldiers

1. Colebatch and Innes, ‘Australians Massacred 27 Viets’, The Age.
2. Colebatch and Innes, ‘Australians Massacred 27 Viets’, The Age. For an account of Cairns’ important role in the moratorium
movements of 1970-71, see Rick Kuhn, ‘The Australian Left, Nationalism and the Vietnam War’, Labour History, 72, May
1997, 163-84. For newspaper reports of Cairns’ allegations. Unidentified ‘Cairns tells of killings’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 2 August 1976, 3. Hugh Crawford and Toni McRae, ‘Massacre Inquiry’, The Sun, 2 August, 1976, 1, 2. Unidentified,
‘Killen hits at claim of Vietnam massacre’, The Australian, 2 August 1976, 1. Unidentified, ‘Probe Massacre says Killen’,
Daily Mirror, 2 August 1976, 2. Our Staff Report, ‘Massacre of Viet. Civilians—Cairns’, The Advertiser, 2 August 1976, 1.
Unidentified, ‘Cairns tells of atrocity’, Canberra Times, 2 August 1976, 4. Unidentified, ‘Diggers accused of Viet killing’,
Daily Telegraph, 2 August 1976, 2.
3. Paul Ormonde, A Foolish Passionate Man: a Biography of Jim Cairns, Penguin Australia, Ringwood, 1981.
4. ‘Massacre of Viet. Civilians—Cairns’, The Advertiser. Phillip McCarthy, ‘The Man who cried massacre’, The Age, 4 August
1976, 3.
5. Crawford and McRae, ‘Massacre Inquiry’, The Sun.
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patrolled free fire exclusions zones created near villages. The rules of engagement meant that
Australian soldiers were entitled to fire at anybody who entered the ‘no-go’ areas. The
Vietnamese enemy fought a guerrilla war where soldiers dressed as civilians and civilians
either volunteered for or were conscripted into playing a support role. But the newly elected
Fraser government was in no mood to seriously investigate the claims made by Cairns.
Defence Minister Jim Killen’s reply to Cairns’ allegations was that they were ‘humbug’ and
utterly contrary to the traditions of the Australian armed services.

6

He dismissed Cairn’s

7

comments as hearsay and defamatory to the Australian nation. Anger among former military
people about Dr Cairns raising the spectre of a war crime was the subject of The Australian’s
lead story on its front page on 3 August 1976.

8

The Australian press in general reacted sceptically to Cairns’ allegations and Killen’s rebuttal,
but did not speak with one voice. In Melbourne, The Age editorialised that it hoped that
Killen was correct in stating that the allegations were nonsense. The Age took the Minister to
task for dismissing the allegations out of hand because ‘his job was not to pontificate, as he
did on Sunday—in Brisbane—without recourse to the record’.

9

The Age concluded that

nothing short of a thorough investigation of the incident was acceptable. The Sydney Sun and
Daily Mirror called for Cairns’ resignation because of his half-baked allegations.

The

Australian, in a long editorial, claimed that Dr Cairns’ naiveté would be his stamp on
history.

10

The report detailing Cairns’ allegations in The Age newspaper was headed

‘massacre’. In their coverage of Cairns’ assertions the newspapers between 2 August and 9
August, the Press used the word ‘massacre’ repetitively.

11

Both The Age and The Australian

stated that Cairns needed to collect more evidence before making allegations. The Australian
suggested that Cairns had implied there had been a miniature My Lai, and had taken the
claims of one old man on face value rather than investigating them.
The implications of a My Lai type massacre galvanised the debate. While Cairns had not
made this accusation, the media were prepared to make the link. With Cairns’ accusations
and Killen’s denials, the media broadcast and published a great many stories, supplemented
by photographs some of which seemed to have been fed directly from the Defence Public

6. Staff Reporter, ‘Massacre of Viet. Civilians – Cairns’, The Advertiser, 2 August 1976. Unidentified, ‘Cairns tells of atrocity’,
Canberra Times, 2 August 1976.
7. Unidentified, ‘Killen hits at claim of Vietnam massacre’, The Australian.
8. Unidentified, ‘Massacre denied by Angry Diggers’, The Australian, 3 August 1976, 1.
9. Editorial, ‘Vietnam: what is the truth?’, The Age.
10. Editorial, ‘Cairns adds to a very sad record’, The Australian.
11. Colebatch and Innes, ‘Australians massacred 27 Viets’, The Age. See footnote 12 for the media’s use of ‘massacre’
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Relations directorate.

12

Photographs that first appeared in the Australian media in 1970

highlighting 8RAR’s successful ambush now reappeared in the press.

13

Senior officers were

prepared to comment readily. Some veterans commented to the press to back the Army’s
claim. The proximity of these ‘witnesses’ to the successful ambush of July 1970 is open to
discussion.

14

It soon became clear that there was no shortage of stories to tell or Vietnam

veterans to be quoted—both identified and unidentified. The debate raged across front pages,
editorials and feature articles.
The Australian reported that senior officers who had been stationed in Vietnam at the time
were adamant that there was no truth to the allegations.

15

One senior officer claimed that Dr

Cairns had made this statement to denigrate all Australian soldiers.

16

Several former soldiers

claimed that Dr Cairns’ version of the events was wrong, and that the bodies in the mounds
were those of the enemy. At that point, the critics could not have known to which graves in
Vietnam Cairns was making reference.

17

Despite his insistence that there was nothing to investigate, Killen seems to have instigated
just such an investigation, or had initiated discussions within the Army. The Sydney Sun
reported that the war diaries and operational records of the units serving in the area at the
time, the Second Battalion (2 RAR), Seventh Battalion (7RAR) and Eight Battalion (8RAR)
of the Royal Australian Regiment, were being examined.

18

The Army, within 24 hours, had

‘identified’ the action described by Dr Cairns and declared that all involved had acted

12. Editorial, ‘Vietnam: what is the truth?’, The Age. Editorial, ‘Cairns adds to a very sad record’, The Australian. Editorial,‘Get
out Dr Cairns’, 3 August, Daily Mirror, 1976, 2. Editorial, ‘Last Post Dr Cairns’, The Sun, 3 August 1976, 2. Tom Jacob and
Neil Mitchell ‘Women in Viet killing: Army’ The Age, 3 August 1976, 1, 4. Unidentified ‘How the Army saw the Hoa Long
Raid’, The Age, 3 August 1976, 3. Unidentified ‘Commander denies massacre’, Illawarra Mercury, 3 August 1976, 1. Our
Canberra Bureau ‘Colonel: Cairns victim of propaganda, The Advertiser, 3 August 1976, 1. Dead Cong had rockets: Digger’,
The Advertiser, 3 August 1976, 1. Frank Cranston, ‘Cairns victim of propaganda’, Canberra Times, 3 August 1976, 1.
Defence Reporter, ‘Killen denies Viet killings’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 1976, 1, 2. Unidentified ‘Soldier says
women and children involved’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 1976, 1, 2. Unidentified, ‘Children thought killed in
ambush’, The Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners Advocate, 3 August 1976, 1. Unidentified, ‘Massacre at Hoa Long’,
Daily Telegraph, 3 August, 1976, 5. Unidentified, ‘The Grey Eight massacre or their finest hour?’, The Sun, 3 August 1976, 22
, 27. Trevor Kavanagh, ‘Massacre Inquiry off’, The Sun, 3 August, 2. Phillip McCarthy, ‘Ambush not like My Lai: Cairns’, The
Age, 4 August 1976, 1. McCarthy, ‘The man who cried massacre’, The Age. Unidentified, ‘Massacre denied’, The Age, 3
August 1976, 4. Unidentified, ‘Commander denies Massacre’, Illawarra Mercury, 3 August 1976, 1. Our Canberra Bureau,
‘Killen Closes Viet case’, The Advertiser, 4 August 1976, 11. Unidentified, ‘There was no atrocity, says Killen’, Illawarra
Mercury, 4 August 1976, 2. Frank Cranston ‘Shooting not possible soldier says’, Canberra Times, 4 August 1976, 3.
Unidentified, ‘Vietnam Allegations dismissed’, Newcastle Morning Herald, 4 August 1976, 1.
13. Honner and Bou, Duty First, 221. Hall, Combat Battalion, 213, 214.
14. Don Tate, The War Within. An example of resistance to reporting history as it happened can be found in the saga of the 2nd D
& E Platoon. It was an ad hoc unit formed during the Vietnam War by the Task Force Commander and involved in a number of
incidents in which soldiers were injured. In claiming compensation, these soldiers were told their unit didn’t exist and
compensation was denied. This started a long battle for recognition which raged over several years. Ekins with McNeill,
Fighting to The Finish, 145-50.
15. ‘Massacre denied by Angry Diggers’, The Australian. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 269, 271.
16. ‘Massacre denied by Angry Diggers’, The Australian.
17. Unidentified soldiers, see ‘Probe Massacre says Killen’, Daily Mirror. Canberra Bureau ‘Dead Cong had rockets: Digger’, The
Advertiser, 3 August 1976, 1. Identified soldier, see ‘Massacre Inquiry’, The Sun. Jacob and Mitchell, 'Women in Viet killing:
Army’, The Age.
18. Crawford and McRae, ‘Massacre Inquiry’, The Sun. ‘Probe Massacre says Killen’, Daily Mirror.
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within its Rules of Engagement.

19

Their strategy was to claim that the operation referred

to by Cairns was in fact a very successful ambush, which occurred roughly about the
time that Cairns pinpointed in his allegations.

20

The Army now claimed that Dr Cairns had

the wrong date, and the graves he was talking about were a result of the successful ambush
involving sub-units of 8RAR, which had occurred in August, and not July, 1970.

21

The former Commanding Officer of 8 RAR, Colonel Keith O’Neill, advised the media that on
the night 11/12 August 1967, a patrol had spotted enemy soldiers entering the village of Hoa
Long, and waited for them to come out again.

22

Colonel O’Neill stated that at first he thought

the patrol had lost its chance when the enemy disappeared. However, at 3am, the enemy
reappeared and were ambushed.

23

He claimed that there were eighteen enemy killed,

including a Vietcong officer, and that five enemy soldiers were captured, including two
armed women. Politicians and the Army used the account of the 8 RAR ambush to ridicule
Cairns’ claims. 8 RAR’s commanding officer dismissed Cairns as a victim of Vietcong
propaganda, and this assertion became the lead headline in a number of newspapers.

24

The Army’s strategy was to focus the media’s attention on the fact that those referred to by
Cairns were definitely enemy ‘killed in action’. The Minister for Defence declared Cairns’
informant a Communist sympathiser, and stated that there were serious discrepancies in the
account brought back by Cairns.

25

Very little space was given to the Vietnamese

complainants in this saga. Language barriers and the difficulties in contacting the villagers in
Vietnam no doubt restricted the media’s access to and interest in their angle on the story. The
Minister stated that there was to be no inquiry as he was convinced that there had been no
atrocity, and Australian troops had always behaved with the highest standards of competence
and decency.

There would be no further action unless someone came forward with

substantial information that warranted steps be taken to institute an investigation.

26

Killen

stated that ‘anonymity should not become the assassin of the reputation of the armed forces of

19. ‘How the Army saw the Hoa Long Raid’, The Age. ‘Massacre denied by Angry Diggers’. The Australian. ‘Commander
denies massacre’, Illawarra Mercury. Our Canberra Bureau ‘Colonel: Cairns victim of propaganda, The Advertiser. Dead
Cong had rockets: Digger’, The Advertiser.
20. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 220-1.
21. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 220-1.
22. Unidentified, ‘How the Army saw the Hoa Long Raid’, The Age. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 220-1.
23. Unidentified, ‘Army claims it met a Viet Cong troop’, The Australian, 3 August 1976, 3. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 221.
This page features a photograph used by SMH on 3 August 1976, 2. The Advertiser, 3 August 1976, 1. and The Sydney Sun,
27.
24. ‘Colonel: Cairns victim of propaganda’, The Advertiser.
25. ‘The man who cried massacre’, The Age. Burstall, A Soldier Returns, 183 where the Army states that “petitioners being VC
sympathizers” was grounds for dismissing claims for compensation. Viet Massacre’, The Sun. This information reflects
Burstall’s work in A Soldier Returns, 180-1. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 102-3. Maddock, ‘Going over the
limit the Question of Australian Atrocities in Maddock, Memories of Vietnam, 151-63. The reason it is not in popular
memory, see Derryn Hinch, The Best of Hinch, The Sun Herald, 24 October 1984.
26. Unidentified, ‘Vietnam killings: new claims’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 August 1976, 1. Unidentified, ‘Killen says no
Vietnam inquiry’, Canberra Times, 6 August 1976, 3.
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this country’.
restored.

27

As far as he was concerned, the Army’s and the nation’s honour had been

28

Journalists from the ABC continued working on the issue. On 5 August 1976, This Day
Tonight broadcast two statutory declarations. Both declarers wished to remain anonymous
until an inquiry had been duly approved by Parliament and their legal positions clarified and
protected.

29

The first statutory declaration came from a psychiatrist who had treated a veteran

whom the psychiatrist thought was trying to establish his eligibility for a pension on the basis
of trauma brought about by the death of his mate.

30

Under the influence of a drug, the veteran

told him a tale of the rape and killing of unarmed civilians.

He said the veteran was

concerned about disclosing this information, and the psychiatrist was unable to give details
for professional reasons.

31

The psychiatrist claimed that if a judicial inquiry were initiated on

a judge’s order, he would have to supply the information, which he had detailed on the
soldier’s file.

32

The second statutory declaration came from a RAAF officer who claimed he had been
ordered to shoot civilians.

33

The incident in which that pilot had been involved occurred

when his aircraft had sighted a group of fifteen Vietnamese walking in a single file. He was
ordered to fire on the Vietnamese a number of times even though they had no visible
weapons. He tried a number of manoeuvres to make them stop before ordering the lead man
34

be shot. This pilot’s statement also disclosed information about a second incident in which
he had not been personally involved.

35

Quoted in The Sydney Morning Herald on 7 August 1976, Killen labelled this television
presentation rumour and vague allegation, defaming the reputation of the Australian armed
forces. Killen stated that he wanted facts such as names; regimental numbers, ranks and units
of the persons involved, and accused the ABC of unfair and biased reporting.

36

The ABC –

most likely to protect the confidentiality of its sources - refused to supply this information and
27. Unidentified, ‘Vietnam killings: new claims’, Sydney Morning Herald.
28. Defence Reporter, ‘Killen denies Viet killings’, Sydney Morning Herald.
29. Unidentified, ‘New Vietnam killing claims spark probe’, Illawarra Mercury, 6 August 1976, 2.
30. Unidentified, ‘New Vietnam killing claims spark probe’, Illawarra Mercury. Our Canberra Office, ‘Check on Vietnam
atrocities’, Daily Telegraph, 6 August 1976, 15.
31. Our Canberra Office, ‘Check on Vietnam atrocities’, Daily Telegraph.
32. Our Canberra Office, ‘Check on Vietnam atrocities’, Daily Telegraph.
33. Unidentified, ‘Killen changes mind over new Vietnam assertions’, Newcastle Morning Herald, 6 August 1976, 3.
34. The information given by this pilot suggests that the anonymity was limited value if you had access to RAAF records and the
Vietnam Veterans’ nominal roll. In the course of my research, contact was made with the co-pilot of this aircraft and he
confirmed the gist of the allegation. The pilot has since died and the co-pilot was planning a book, which would include
these details. The book has not yet appeared.
35. Unidentified, ‘Vietnam killings: new claims’, Sydney Morning Herald. Unidentified, ‘Killen says no Vietnam inquiry’
Canberra Times. Unidentified, ‘New Vietnam killing claims spark probe’, Illawarra Mercury.
36. Defence Reporter, ‘Declarations on alleged war crimes withheld’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1976, 2.
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therefore the Minister refused to investigate the issue.

The situation changed dramatically on 8 August 1976 when the Brisbane Sunday Sun led with
a story ‘The atrocity is on file’ by a former national serviceman, Kevin Keliher. Keliher was
a staff writer and formerly a clerk in 1 ATF Headquarters.

37

He claimed he had not spoken

on this matter previously because of the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, but felt he
could now write because the Minister for Defence had promised to investigate allegations
made openly.

38

Keliher claimed that he had viewed documents dealing with the ‘massacre’ of

Vietnamese by Australian troops.

39

This ‘atrocity’ was on file, according to Keliher. His

newspaper article identified our platoon’s ambush party from ‘Alpha’ company of the
Queensland based 2 RAR.

40

Killen’s reply was that he had asked the Chief of the General Staff to present him with the
diaries covering the period of the alleged incident.

41

Although there were many errors in

Keliher’s article, it set in motion an immediate investigation by the Army which involved
tracing me as patrol commander that same morning.

42

I was asked to assist the A rmy in

locating the details of my ambush. The following day Monday, 9 August I spent time with
Ian McNeill, the Army historian and later author of the Official History volume To Long
Tan. Because I had documents relating to this incident, the paper trail was easy to follow.
NcNeil also was able to consult the Commander’s Diary, which included the report that I
wrote at the time.

Meanwhile the ABC found two members of 2 Platoon who confirmed Kehiler’s story that
civilians had been killed. These veterans were willing to give their rank, name, serial number
and unit on camera.

43

Their account of the numbers of civilians killed by our platoon of

course did not match Cairns’ claim that twenty-seven civilians were killed in an operation of
the Australian task force.

The platoon members who appeared on This Day Tonight

confirmed that this was an ambush gone wrong and that there was no intention to kill
civilians. Nonetheless, the ABC had finally met the Minister’s requirement for an inquiry.
The Brisbane Sun’s disclosure and checking of the Commander’s Diaries led to the Minister

37. Keliher, ‘Atrocity is on File’ Brisbane Sunday, Sunday 8 August 1976 1, 8.
38. Keliher, ‘Atrocity is on File’ Brisbane Sunday.
39. Keliher, ‘Atrocity is on File’ Brisbane Sunday.
40. The facts of the ambush are contained in AWM 95/7/2/45 Part 1 2RAR Duty Officer’s Log Sheet No 52 Serials 929-32, 934,
937-939, 944, 946, Sheet 53 Serials 950, 956, 962, 965, 968, 970 and 973.
41. AWM 95/7/2/45 Part 1, 2RAR Duty Officer’s Log Sheet No 52 Serials 929-32, 934, 937-39, 944, 946, Sheet 53 Serials 950,
956, 962, 965, 968, 970 and 973.
42. Keliher, ‘Atrocity is on File’, Brisbane Sun.
43. This Day Tonight, 9 August 1976.
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of Defence having to issue a statement that the Task Force had killed unarmed civilians.

44

Some brief information about the ambush was released to the media and parts of the story
appeared in different media.

45

The two platoon members confirming that civilians had been

killed and the company commander’s discussion about old enemy weapons in the previous
chapter suggests that Cairns’ allegation reference the killing of civilians and then claiming
them has enemy dead may have some substance.

But there was no enquiry and there the

story lay dormant for several years.

The competing agendas of various institutions and individuals led to the appearance of widely
divergent narratives.

46

The Government’s narrative followed a predictable course of

defending the war, its institutions and its personnel.

The Army vigorously defended the

honour of the Defence Force, and opposed anyone who suggested otherwise. The ABC had
an agenda to investigate an important story, and, though often accused of left-wing bias, this
seems to have been a case of a media outlet attempting to hold the Minister to account.

The issue was never satisfactorily laid to rest. On 21 October 1984, the well-known media
commentator Derrin Hinch in the Sydney Sun referred to the ambush conducted by my
platoon as epitomizing the cover-ups that the government had used to conceal the truth about
an unjustified war.

47

Hinch suggested that if the ‘truth’ about the war had been available to

the public then Australia would have withdrawn earlier than the Government decided.
Even though Hinch acknowledged that the civilian casualties related to this ambush were an
accident, he used it as an example of an Australian cover up on the Vietnam battlefield.

The Official History dealing with the period of the Vietnam War appeared in the 1990s. It
dealt with the issue by ignoring the ambush and the controversy altogether. Terry Burstall’s
book appeared at much the same time as the Official History. Burstall suggested that our
platoon sprung its ambush in the wrong place, that is, outside of the exclusion area.
According to Burstall, the civilian deaths in this instance amounted to the ‘worst case found’
in terms of Australian soldiers and civilian casualties. Burstall used my patrol commander’s
report to suggest that Australian soldiers killed civilians, claimed them as enemy and then

44. Unidentified, ‘Defence Minister denies massacre’, Illawarra Mercury, 10 August 1976, 3 —generally right. Unidentified,
‘Civilians killed by troops’, The Courier Mail, 10 August 1976, 1. Unidentified, ‘Our Men Killed Civilians’, The Advertiser,
10 August 1976, 3. Both reports have the date of the incident wrong while the rest of the report reflects the commander’s
diary and patrol commander’s report.
45. Unidentified, ‘Four Viets Killed in Australian Ambush’, Ballarat Courier, 10 August 1976, 2. ‘Civilians Killed by Troops’,
Courier Mail. ‘Defence Minister Denies Massacre’, Illawarra Mercury. ‘Killen Rejects New Massacre Claim’, Sydney
Morning Herald, 10 August 1976, 4. ‘Our Men Killed Civilians’, The Advertiser. ‘Killen Denies Massacre Claim’, The
Australian, 10 August 1976, 5.
46. Kulik, War Stories, 24-5.
47. Hinch, The Best of Hinch, The Sun Herald,
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48

congratulated themselves on a successful operation.

While a fair-minded observer may have concluded that this debate was political and media
hyperbole, it was just as likely that the public would sense that there was a war crime of some
sort lurking in the background. The public, under the influence of My Lai may well have
concluded that the Army had covered up a genuine atrocity. The Army, after all, had not
checked all the facts properly and had defended a position, which was later proved to be
incorrect.

In this case the competing sides had ideological sides to defend. Neither Cairns nor the Army
was interested in a complicated story of an ambush gone wrong. Similarly the media wanted
sensational stories to sell their product and therefore they milked both sides of the controversy.
For those interested in what actually happened the soldiers’ view was needed to ascertain the
correct story.

48. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 102. Burstall, A Soldier Returns, 180. Maddock, Memories of Vietnam, 153.
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CHAPTER SIX:
INVESTIGATING THE AMBUSH WRITTEN AND ORAL SOURCES

Any investigation of this ambush has to start with the primary written sources. However,
these written sources have their limitations. The principal repository of the written documents
pertaining to the Vietnam battlefield is the Commander’s Diary.

1

The Commander’s Diary

is not a notebook style diary, and was not kept by an individual ‘Commander’, and did not
contain any personal information about individual soldiers. It is a collection of documents
that were routinely produced by the Battalion HQ, Company or Unit Commander’s HQ.
It included as many as twenty-seven individual documents: orders, battlefield objectives,
after- action reports, reports on enemy activity and any intelligence related to day to day
operations, as well as the battlefield activities of groups including Company and Platoon
operations.

The Commander’s Diary preserves the main documents used by unit historians to assist in the
production of battalion histories.

2

The actions of many individuals and groups including

operational orders, platoons and companies’ requests for reinforcements, and information
about the enemy are recorded together, so that they become intermingled. By separating
the actions of one group, for example a company or platoon, a better understanding of their
activities on the battlefield can be achieved. This allows the timeline for one specific group to
emerge. In the case of the ambush described above, the details of an incident are reported
in a number of serials interspersed with other reports.

The Commander’s Diary is akin to a ship’s log which is used to determine the distance a ship
travelled within a certain amount of time, records weather conditions, times of routine events
and significant incidents, details the crew complement, and which ports were docked at and
when. The operations log (ops log) attached to the Commander’s Diary records the location,
time and events of a unit or sub-unit if it is away from the main body of the unit. In Vietnam,
transcribed radio records called ops logs, and the patrol commanders’ reports were to be
found in the Commander’s Diary.

3

Two radio networks are especially pertinent to

my research. The first is the radio network that controlled all operational activity within the
Australian Task Force. This network provided communication between the Task Force

1. The AWM uses the term ‘War Diary’ and ‘Commander’s Diary’ interchangeably.
2. Newman, The ANZAC Battalion.
3. Australian War Memorial website http://www.awm.gov.au/diaries/seasia/ last checked 24/10/10
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Headquarters and the three infantry battalions including 2 RAR (Second Battalion of the
Royal Australian Regiment), as well as other supporting arms and services. The radio traffic
on this network was recorded in the Task Force ops log, and is included in the 1 ATF
(Australian Task Force) Commander’s Diaries.

The second radio network controlled

communication between the battalion headquarters of 2 RAR and sub-units under its command.
This radio traffic was recorded at battalion headquarters and written in the battalion ops log.
These ops logs were subsequently included in the 2RAR Commander’s Diary.

The Commander’s Diary is a crucial repository of information but has its limitations. The
most noticeable feature of the ops log is that it records information flowing at higher levels
from company to battalion to task force, but not generally at the two lower levels of section to
platoon to company. Communications between company and platoons was carried out by
both personal and radio contact, neither of which was recorded. Communications between
platoon headquarters and sections was made by hand signals or personal contact. There were
no radios at this level of command so there is no written record of activities at these levels.

Secondly, the narrative contained in Form C2118 tends to celebrate and congratulate the unit
rather than to criticise or point out any action that may reflect unfavourably on the unit’s
4

history. My report described the events as follows:
The patrol had laid an ambush on a track when noise and talking were heard.
Subsequently a group of 16 people walked into the ambush. The leading
Vietnamese saw the machine gunner and pointed at him with his shoulder
carrying stick.

The machine gunner took the stick to be a weapon and

opened fire. The remainder of the platoon then opened fire, catching most
of the group as they ran back south. After 2-3 minutes firing, I ordered
cease-fire when I heard a woman cry out. I moved forward and found
what we thought to be weapons were in fact shoulder carrying sticks. We
then evacuated all dead and wounded.
Terrain: thick bamboo and old paddy fields with grass 4-5 mtrs high.
Visibility 25-30 metres high.
EN: First sighted 60 metres. 16 civilians. First fired at 15-20 mtrs.
EN Cas: 4 dead, 6 wounded, 3 captured.
Docs weapons captured: Nil.

4. Army Form C2118 is a War Diary or Intelligence Summary. It is a chronological summary of events and information, and may
include attachments such as orders or communications transcripts, etc.
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Lessons learned: The great difficulty identifying civilians from VC in close
country. Coy [Company] Commanders Comments: 1. The ambush was well
laid and executed.

The actions of the pltn commander were entirely correct, unfortunate as it
was for the civilians concerned.

2. The patrol commander is to be

commended for his control of the situation and his rapid evacuation of the
wounded.’
The ambush is recorded as a success, albeit one with tragic consequences. If we accept the
Commander’s Diary as the only source of information, we skim the surface. Other written
documentation is available. I checked on the disposal of the bodies in the First Australian
Task Force Commander’s Diary where it states that ‘at 1715H, a RAAF helicopter took the 4
KIA VN and 1 relative to Dat Do, a large town near the Task Force’.

5

As some of my

narrators suggested, there were rumours that the bodies of the dead civilians were dumped at
sea to cover up a bungled operation. The fact that an official document stated something
different to the rumour is unlikely to convince those who suspected dark forces at work.

Other issues cannot be resolved on the basis of the available documentation. Terry Burstall
claims the patrol was outside the 4000 metres restricted area, although his evidence for
making this assertion is not clear.

6

In the newspapers of August 1976, the Minister of

Defence claimed the 23 October 1967 incident of 2 Platoon was inside that area, and this was
7

also my opinion as reflected in my report found in the Commander’s Diary. Alpha Company
8

commander noted that the dead civilians were 2000 meters inside the restricted area. This,
of course, is the same individual who wanted me to place old weapons on the bodies of the
dead civilians and so his claims cannot be taken at face value. For all the radio transcripts
that made its way into the Commander’s Diary for this particular operation, there is no
information there that will establish beyond a shadow of doubt whether the ambush took
place within or without the exclusion zone. The Commander’s Diaries (1 ATF and 2 RAR)
did not give any detail about the status of the Vietnamese killed, wounded and captured,
except to say that the survivors had been interrogated and classified as

5. AWM95 1/4/61, 1 ATF Narrative Duty Officers Log [1–31 Oct 67], Serial 3051, 3105, 3107, 3108.
6. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 102.
7. ‘Killen Rejects New Massacre Claim’, Sydney Morning Herald. 235287 E B Morris, After Action Report, 24 October 1967.
8. AWM 95/7/2/45 Part 1 2RAR Duty Officer’s Log Sheet No 52
Serials 929, 930, 931, 932, 934, 937, 938, 939, 944, 946, Sheet No 53 Serials 950, 956, 962, 965, 968, 970 and 973.
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9

civilians. The main fact was that there was nothing to identify them as enemy.

9. 1 ATF Commander’s Diary, October 1967 3044, 3047, 3055, 3105, 3107 and 3108.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
ORAL SOURCES
The Second Battalion Royal Australian Regiment was based in Queensland for the duration of
the Vietnam War. Initially it was located in Enoggera near Brisbane and after the first tour, it
returned to this Brisbane base. However, before it left for its second tour, the battalion was
relocated to Lavarack Army base in Townsville. The soldiers, I interviewed were all members
of the Brisbane based Second Battalion. This skewed the geographical origins of the platoon.
In the later part of their Corps training they were requested to nominate the unit they wished
to serve with. The choices were 2 RAR Brisbane, 7 RAR Puckapunyal or the Reinforcement
Unit in Sydney. 2 and 7 RAR were the next battalions designated to deploy to Vietnam. The
Reinforcement Wing supplied soldiers to fill unplanned vacancies or individuals due for
rotation in units already deployed to the theatre of war. This choice gave individuals no
option to avoid service in Vietnam. While the soldiers knew they were going to be involved
in workup exercises there was a chance if they were in their home state, they would be able to
spend some time with their families. Naturally the Queensland born individuals opted for
service in the battalion based in their home state. This resulted in the bulk of the platoon
being Queenslanders.

The eldest member of the platoon was 33 and he had served with the French Foreign Legion
in Vietnam and claimed to have been present at the decisive French defeat at Battle of Dien
Bien Phu. He was one of six regular enlistments who were the older members of the platoon.
Two were aged 31 including the platoon sergeant and one section commander. The other
section commander was 25 years old; one lance corporal was 24 and two of the remaining
regular soldiers were 23. The largest age group comprised nineteen platoon members born in
1945. This group consisted of three regular soldiers and sixteen National Servicemen. The
residual six younger members were two national servicemen aged 21 and four regular soldiers
who were 20. These least experienced regulars had come straight out their initial recruit and
corps training into the reinforcement system. The exception in this group was the stretcherbearer who had joined the Army to become a band member and ended up in the battalion as
the company’s medic. In terms of pre-Vietnam experience, four regular soldiers served in
Malaysia with three having being deployed on operations in Borneo prior to joining the
Battalion.
The patrol that conducted the ambush described in detail in this thesis comprised six regular
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soldiers and nine national servicemen. Eleven platoon members gave information on the
ambush, which represented the majority of the fifteen-man patrol. There were six regulars
described here as: myself (Morris), Bruce, Cisco, Milo, Rupert, and Willie. There were nine
national servicemen: Atticus, Bart, Bernard, Charles, Diego, Jack, Joe, Robbie, and Zac. Two
of those who took part in the patrol were killed in action in late November in separate
incidents. Three of the regular soldiers have died of war-caused injuries since returning to
Australia. The ambush is remembered by members of the patrol as the ‘Bamboo Pickers’
incident.

My narrators dwelled on why we had been called upon to undertake this patrol. Some of my
narrators stated that they believed that this type of patrolling was for the reinforcements to
become familiar with the local area. Others thought that the allocation of the task was a
1

punishment for a breach of discipline. As Joe explained:
2

Our platoon had to provide a three-day TAOR patrol, which was highly
unusual because that was provided usually by the D & E platoon. For some
reason there was no one. I guess the rare circumstances they didn’t do it
they went to other platoons and would say, ‘you’ve got supply a TAOR
party. Anyway because someone had found beer in our lines, which was a
very regular occurrence, they said, ‘Take half a platoon, get out on this
TAOR patrol.’ It turned out to be a bit different with tragic
consequences, and I’m not sure whether it was on the third morning or the
second morning for the Bamboo Pickers. Because it was a three-day TAOR
patrol, and having been on quite a few operations, I think we thought this
was ok we are being punished but it was a safe country.

3

Joe considered that the platoon had been sent out on this TAOR (Tactical Area of
Responsibility) Patrol as a punishment. The Commander’s Diary indicates that this patrol
was allocated as part of the task force close protection activities.

Alcohol had become a serious problem within the Task Force and our company seemed to
4

have an unlimited supply. This problem is discussed in the Official History. The ration for
beer was two cans per man per day for all personnel. This meant that the Task Force
consumed an average of 3,100 cartons per week. Excessive alcohol consumption was

1. 1 ATF Rear Patrol Programme For Period 140800H OCT to 200800H OCT 67, 10 October 1967. Joe pseudonym, interview
by author Ben Morris, name withheld, tape and transcript held by author, date and location withheld.
2. TAOR means “Tactical Area of Responsibility”. Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, 199
3. Joe, interview.
4. Ekins, Fighting to the Finish, 75.
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a problem within the task force base at Nui Dat.

In early 1967, Brigadier Graham

took over and attempted to impose restrictions upon alcohol consumption. His aim was to
change the expectation that when soldiers came into Nui Dat after operations, they were
entitled to ‘get a belly full of beer’.

Officers had been instructed to conduct regular

checks on unit canteens to stop excessive drinking.

It was suspected that some

company canteens were buying alcohol outside the Australian Services Canteen
Organisation supply line.

At the time the ambush was sprung the patrol had been out for three days and no alcohol had
been consumed since they left camp to the knowledge of the patrol commander. Even so,
other narrators focused upon the fact that all was not well within the patrol with the platoon.
5

The war in Vietnam frayed everybody’s nerves, as many accounts have recognised. Atticus
noted that: ‘I think we were going a bit troppo then when that (ambush) happened’.

6

It is

recognised that morale declined over time. Supposedly it was at the sixth month mark of a
7

tour that there was a rise in crime according Brigadier Hughes. As was often the case, it was
not fighting the enemy that broke morale, but routine and absence of action. The platoon
had been patrolling for about two months and had not had a contact. It was a frustrating
period because the platoon was expecting active operations and there had been no contact
with the enemy.

Joe talks about the fact that we were going through the early-morning routine:
I remember the normal stand-to before first light and I think it went for
about an hour and finally the signal came down to stand-down so people
could get meals, there was always somebody with a machine gun, so I get
the hexie stove out and I’m lighting up and I remember Cisco was there with
me. I still remember.

8

I remember because, and it is one of those things how the hell I could
remember, what I was going to have for breakfast, it is one of those things
frozen in my mind just like the JFK assassination.

Anyway someone

(Cisco?) tapped me on the shoulder, thumbs down, and I looked at him
and thought he had to be fucking kidding and just kept going.

9

5. Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 209, 210. Ekins, Fighting to the Finish, 350. Church, Second To None, 178. Hall, Combat
Battalion, 233.
6. Atticus pseudonym, interview by author Ben Morris, name withheld, tape and transcript held by author, date and location
withheld.
7. Davies and McKay, Vietnam, 365.
8. Joe, interview.
9. Joe, interview.
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Over to one side of the ambush, Atticus could not remember who was with him in his
nominated position. In an ambush the soldiers were normally in groups of two. Atticus
pondered:

Actually I was with Robbie on his gun then or did Robbie open up and I was
with Zac? Anyhow I was at the other end and you could see them coming
across! ................. I was probably with Robbie on that morning I think and
we didn’t know what was happening. There was about eight or nine people
and you could see their silhouette.

10

Robbie was sure he and Atticus were partners for this patrol. Robbie goes on to say:

from memory it was a fifteen-man ambush, three day ambush… It was the
day we were to come home - everyone was totally relaxed. The position had
more or less been stood down, for a better way of explaining it, when voices
were heard and everyone went to state of readiness. Atticus and I were in
the same pit together, or same position not a pit, and we were standing up
looking over kunai grass counting them as they came across the clearing.
Why I say there was fifteen of us was because when I counted the sixteenth I
went for cover because we were outnumbered.

11

Robbie’s memory was especially impressive. Interestingly, his narration reveals a concern
that the patrol was outnumbered by enemy soldiers; civilians would not cause well-armed
soldiers to go for cover. Other platoon members recalled that they were not sure if the
villagers had weapons. Bart recalled seeing what he initially thought was a weapon. In the
shadows of the bamboo, the stick looked like a weapon: ‘I can remember the fucken stick and
I thought it was a rifle’, said Bart.

12

Clearly, though, he was still debating the issue in his

mind and concluded his narrative by saying it was only a carrying stick: ‘Well he was about
from here to that post away from me. I could see the stick and I just kept quiet and looking
around at everybody’.

13

What Bart saw had changed from a rifle to a carrying stick, but for others the rules of
engagement had been satisfied, and the ambushers waited in silence until the ambush was

10. Atticus, interview.
11. Robbie pseudonym, interview by author Ben Morris, name withheld, tape and transcript held by author, date and location withheld.
12. Bart pseudonym, interview by author Ben Morris, name withheld, tape and transcript held by author, date and location withheld.
13. Bart, interview.
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sprung by the machine gunner. Jack went on to say: ‘and then all of a sudden the two guys on
the far end dropped a couple of the first guys, the gun opened up’.

14

Jack was a member of the gun group, which was to trigger the ambush. He recalled:

I was with the gun and I can’t remember the guy, he was a reg and he
had varicose veins, was on the machine gun. He was on the gun and I was
number two. I remember seeing these people come through. I saw they had
no weapons but I couldn’t see who was behind them....and then someone
opened up and that was it. Because they must have seen the same thing
but I could see it was a stick. So everyone just opened up.

15

Interviewer: ‘It looked like a rifle?’
‘Yeah it did. Once one bullet fired everyone went’.

16

Robbie remembers the springing of the ambush: ‘Next thing a machine gun opened up and
then all hell broke loose’. As he described it, ‘the ANZAC tradition came to the fore’.

17

Jack recalls what he did when the gun opened up:
then I took my SLR and nailed that woman in blue as she come and I kept
me shots going down that track. Milo went up with his F1 (submachine
gun), a woman and a man wounded in the path and Milo went forward and
put a couple more rounds in them…. Someone up in the tree opened fire
down that track as well, I dunno who that was. We gathered them up.

18

At the back of the ambush, Joe abandoned his cooking duties:
Anyway then we heard gunfire pretty close range, so the beans went, so we
hit the ground and people are looking everywhere and this bloody machine
gun started up and I didn’t know whether it was coming towards us or away

14. Jack pseudonym, interview by author Ben Morris, name withheld tape and transcript held by author, date and location
withheld.
15. Jack, interview.
16. Bart, interview.
17. Robbie, interview.
18. Jack, interview.
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from us. I remember Rupert, the corporal, coming and signalled to us to
come with him and face out the back. So I went with Rupert and I think
Cisco did and we covered the back and the action is up towards the front.
It couldn’t have been too long but there was plenty of lead flying and
screams.

19

How long did the platoon fire its weapons until they realised that there was no returning fire?
As Jack explained:

Very quick, not very long. Shit how do you tell time in that. I would say
it was all over in a minute, two minutes. There was, I mean it would have
gone a lot longer if there had of been someone armed there but I think
once it was really obvious there wasn’t anyone armed there that the
shooting stopped pretty quick.

20

Robbie recalled that:
Then I can remember you (Morris) yelling out something like ‘Cease
fire,’ or ‘Stop firing’, or something like that.

21

Meanwhile from the back of the ambush Joe tried to see what was happening:

There was a lot of distress. In the end I think we were told it was all down
the front so we didn’t have to worry so much about the back and even
though we had been looking towards where the action was and still looking
over our shoulder by this stage that we thought there was something pretty
big happening.

I remember the word went out to get a whole lot of

choppers in, lots of choppers…I suppose each chopper would only take two
people.

22

The patrol secured the area, rounding up the survivors, attending the wounded, and checking
the dead. After the platoon captured all the people who were in the ambush area, Jack
19. Joe, interview.
20. Joe, interview.
21. Robbie, interview.
22. Joe, interview.
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remembers:
I remember there’s one old guy there. We rounded them up, we went into
that clearing area, had them rounded up. Checked out the dead ones from
the live ones, there was one old guy there and he still had a sickle and he
was standing right in front of me and I was sure he was gonna have a go
but I was a bit of a prick I was going to let him because I mean I knew
he had no chance of reaching me but someone yelled out to him make him to
put that fucken sickle down so… otherwise… thank goodness that guy did
yell out because I was going to go this guy.

23

Medical evacuation helicopters arrived amazingly quickly in Vietnam; the aim was to
evacuate the wounded (and the dead) out of the area.

24

First aid was administered to the

wounded, and they were quickly loaded onto a number of helicopters and taken out of the
patrol’s area.

25

Jack thinks that there was more to the bamboo pickers than was acknowledged at the time:

They had spare sandals with them, um… excuse for shooting, we didn’t
know what was down that track. I saw those in front of us didn’t have guns
but I wasn’t going to take the chance that there were…I do think they were
off to a camp or something, someone must have known more than we did to
set that ambush like it was. I know… that’s all I really know about it. I
know I told lies about how many rounds I fired because I always carried
extra anyway, but I’d gone through a mag and a half.

26

Bruce, the soldier who most likely fired the first shot, died before he could be interviewed.
He was a regular army rifleman. On this patrol, the normal machine gunner was absent and
Bruce volunteered to take this position. His widow gave very specific details of this incident,
telling me that she had learnt about the ambush by listening to her husband talking in his
sleep. She claimed that he had never discussed the matter with her. Nonetheless, her

23. Jack, interview.
24. AWM 95/7/2/45 Part 1, 2RAR Duty Officer’s Log serial 930.
25. AWM 95/1/4/61, 1 ATF Duty Officer’s Operation Log Sheet 217 Serial 3037, Sheet 218 Serials 3038, 3039, 3040, 3044,
3047, 3051.
26. Number of rounds in a magazine depends on the weapon! SLR 30 rounds, Owen gun 33 rounds, AR15 20rounds, GPMG was
belt feed with 100 rounds per belt, belts could be linked up. Stoppages occurred because of overheating.
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knowledge was remarkably accurate and detailed.

Some veterans wanted to blame Bruce for the killing of civilians. As Robbie put it:

It was more or less mayhem there for a while until law and order was
pulled into gear. It was then that the shit hit the fan really, to think
that...To this day, from what I’ve heard from others involved in that action
it was totally unnecessary. The bloke on the machine gun was told not to
fire by his Number 2, they were civilians, and he just opened up and I think
we know who that person was, Bruce the Scrub Goose.

27

Joe spoke more kindly of Bruce:

Anyway it was just a tragedy and who was at fault? Well I don’t blame
anyone on our side. I would like to think had I been there I would have
looked more carefully but it is easy for me to say. I wasn’t there. The other
thing was they shouldn’t have been there, this is the civvies, because rightly
or wrongly there were leaflets tossed out for the last couple of years I
suppose in Vietnamese saying this is a free-fire zone don’t come in and
these people were taking a short cut and I suppose they had done it
before and they’d never come across a TAOR patrol.

I think a more

seasoned experienced person may have held fire, I like to think I would
have but I don’t know, but Bruce had been a reinforcement, recent arrived
… and I don’t know whether that makes any difference, but anyway he was
doing his job. I don’t know whether he told them to stop or whatever, who
knows, but he let go.

28

Later Robbie comments:

Going back to Bruce I do remember now being told later on that he [ the
man with the stick] aimed and, it may have been Bernard, that he thought it
was a rifle and you shoot first and ask questions later…

27. Robbie, interview.
28. Joe, interview.
29. Robbie, interview.
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29

While Robbie is harsh on Bruce, he is certain that he himself killed two young girls that day.
Their wounds were consistent with the ballistics of his weapon.

30

As he put it:

To this day I believe I was responsible for killing two teenage girls. I was
the only one in the unit with an armalite and one of the girls had a bullet
in the head, just a little black spot, if she had been hit with a 7.62 she would
have had a hole in the back of her head and there was nothing. The other
one was the same situation, shot in the chest just above the breast and
there again just a little black hole and the size of an adult Vietnamese
from that range a 7.62 would have taken half her back out, but there was
nothing, just those two little black holes.

I was the only one with an

armalite, there were no F1s, no 9 Mil weapons there that day, the rest are
one M60 or me with the armalite.

31

Jack remembers preparing for the choppers:
and I remember going down, most of us I suppose, we went down and
knocked some grass down so that they could land.
I remember waiting for them to be taken away with the chopper,
holding them up and… I remember that guy with a sickle. I remember
waiting for them to be taken away with the chopper, were quickly flown
out of the patrol’s area.

32

Joe recalled organising for the helicopters:
I wasn’t that far away but Rupert took us out the back in case it could have
been something different and he wanted to cover three-sixty degrees.

I

think by this stage some of them were attending to the wounded, some were
dead and others were badly injured and I guess they were dressing the
wounds. Someone was on the radio getting choppers in. I forget how many
of were involved, a few of us went down to clear some grass and I think toss
out a smoke grenade.

33

30. Robbie, interview.
31. Robbie, interview.
32. Jack, interview.
33. Joe, interview
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Some of the reflections are dark and conspiratorial. Joe, in his concluding remarks on the
Bamboo Pickers, claimed that after the incident the scene had been tidied up – that our Air
Force had dumped the dead bodies in the South China Sea.

34

This may have been the start of

a myth, which I think this soldier needed to believe to put a tidy end to a nasty part of his life
on the battlefield. His words were:
Now some of the other stories I’ve heard, totally unverified and I can’t
believe they are true; someone said with the dead the choppers actually went
out over the South China Sea and threw them out…That is the one I
remember, I didn’t believe that then and I still don’t believe it but it was
around, the story was around.

35

The story of Vietnamese being thrown out of helicopters has been recorded in both American
and Australian literature.

36

Even though Joe claims he does not believe the gossip, he still

asks the question: ‘The bodies were taken back to base somewhere were they?’ I told Joe that
the bodies went off in the helicopter but they definitely were not thrown out over the sea. Joe
responded: ‘I couldn’t believe that, the RAAF they wouldn’t do it, but that is the story we
were told’.

37

Jack was of the view that the platoon could have shot the whole lot and no-one would have
known:
‘I don’t know that we are too humane.

If we weren’t we would have

knocked them all off…’ Jack wondered too ‘what was behind that ambush,
I mean obviously we knew they were going to be there, that was the way it
struck me. So someone had organised for us to brass them up. When Jack
returned to Nui Dat he told some mates who had come to celebrate: I know
that when me mates came to see me from C Company, they didn’t know
that the people were unarmed, I told them ‘they didn’t have guns, mate’.

Later, Jack speaks of the following experience during a visit to the local markets:

34. Joe, interview.
35. Joe, interview.
36. Baker, Nam. Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam. Terry, Bloods. Alan Ramsey, ‘The Bicycle Padre’, Sydney Morning Herald.
37. Joe, interview.
38. Jack, interview.
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38

I remember one day down here at the markets when I was going through a
rough time, an Asian woman in a blue shirt like that woman had on
came walking through the crowd and you know I really believed it was her.
I thought she was going to come over and tell me off. I thought, she’s gonna
fucken give me an earful that woman, that’s how my head had gone stupid.

39

Joe was adamant that the civilians should not have been there because there was information
about the ‘no-go zone’:
they shouldn’t have been there, they knew that because of these leaflets, we
found them from day one when we arrived they were all over the place… I
remember actually picking up several of those little leaflets which were in
very pristine condition and I kept them, I might still have them somewhere.
I don’t know what was on them but you could get the gist that there was a
warning, ‘Don’t go here,’ or words to that effect. Or ‘we are going to have
an operation in this area fairly soon and be warned.’ But that was a very
distressing incident for everyone involved, I don’t blame anyone and as I
say had it been me I might have done the same thing. I felt sorry for Scrub
Goose because I haven’t seen the guy since actually. I mean six weeks later
I got hit myself and left I don’t know what happened to him, I have never
seen him at reunion of any sort.

40

Atticus’ comment followed up on this theme:
they were supposed to be in an unauthorised zone or something. No we
were never told anything, it was all covered up wasn’t it. I think after that
they decided it was time for us to go back to camp, is that correct? They
thought that we’d had enough by then and we had.

41

Bart remembers:
And we had to get up and fuck off and head straight back to Nui Dat.’ Yeah.
Straight back.

42

Juan, who was not present at the ambush, spoke at length about why the civilians should not
39. Jack, interview.
40. Joe, interview.
41. Atticus, interview.
42. Bart, interview.
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have entered the area, and why their presence meant they had to be enemy:

43

..you know an ambush of one night of some so-called civilians. Now I
wasn’t there. But I’d personally doubted they were civilians because
probably they shouldn’t have been there and that doesn’t make them a
civilian.

44

Or as Diego put it:
We were in the right when we opened that ambush up, because we were
1000 metres away from the nearest village; we had a dark to dawn curfew on
all civvies; anything that moved in that period was enemy. When we opened
the ambush up, when we had our targets in the killing area, it was just
starting to break first light; and in that situation, I have no problems at
all. I justified it to myself then, and I’ll do it again, now. We were right
in opening that ambush up. It was unfortunate that civvies, both old and
young were caught up in it, but they were in the wrong place at the wrong
time. I’d just like to clear that point, because I know it affected Ben. It
didn’t worry me at all, and it still doesn’t worry me today on that same
issue. But we’ll move on from there.

45

Robbie tells what he remembers of the media frenzy started by Cairns:
Just deviating a little bit from that action after we were home, and here again
I am only guessing, two years after there was an article in a Sydney
paper, Sydney Telegraph, ‘Australia’s My Lai’, and it was about that action.
Two people that I know of for sure…were contacted by the Sydney press
about that story and both of them told the reporters to go and get rooted, that
there was nothing in it.
Someone did tell me back in the 1970s I think it was this incident got a bit of
publicity and Bruce allegedly went to some press and was referring to the
My Lai style massacre.

46

43. Juan, interview, by author Ben Morris, name withheld tape and transcript held by author, date and location withheld.
44. Juan, interview.
45. Diego, interview.
46. Robbie, interview.
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Juan, who was not in the ambush party, recalls being pursued by a journalist; he was sure that
he knows who told the media that he was in 2 Platoon.

But as I said I wasn’t there but when I came back to Australia I was
pursued by a fellow because he found out a politician who found out that
I was in two platoon. I don’t suppose it was hard for a politician to find
somebody who was in a platoon that might have been involved in an
incident. And this fellow was none other than Jim Cairns and he pursued
me for quite a long time trying to get – he had journalists from a current
affair programs on television and I can’t recall the title of the program on
this particular day when they were really pressing me and they said
they’d have a helicopter, a journalist up there on a chopper from Sydneythis was, I was at Kingaroy at the time, that day – and it would be on
television that night. Anyway I refused again to say anything. Number one
I wasn’t there and I’d already told them I wasn’t there.
didn’t want to talk about it.

And secondly I

It’s not right to talk about those sorts of

things in my opinion because whose going to prove what those people were
anyway… As far I was concerned we all did the best we could over there
and if somebody got in the road then bad luck, particularly if they shouldn’t
have been there. I don’t believe these people should have been where they
were. I guess they’re going out to see families somewhere but might have
been fighting against us, I don’t know.

That was an incident that

happened there and it was something that pursued me after I came home,
you know, even though I wasn’t involved in it. 47

None of the members of the patrol denied that the incident had taken place. Yet most
narrators only discussed the matter when asked a direct question about it. It can be concluded
that if the interviewer had not been aware of the incident, it was unlikely to have been raised.
Some matters could not be progressed. For example, none of my narrators overheard the
conversation I had with the company commander who asked me to place weapons on the
civilian killed to make it appear that they were armed.48

47. Juan, interview.
48. Barry Corse, interview by Ben Morris, tape and transcript held by author, Perth, 25 June 2012.

80

The underlying concern was that discussing the matter could lead to more unpleasantness and that
all platoon members had had enough experience of that on their return from Vietnam. They
felt that most of the population did not understand and their view had been coloured by the
Americans’ failure to handle My Lai properly and they did not want that tag applied to them.
Most of the narrators who took part in the Bamboo Pickers’ ambush patrol were when questioned
prepared to discuss the incident. The predominant feeling was anger. What the trigger for that
anger varied between individuals and its cause is beyond the scope of this research. They had
regrets about the incident as they believe they had come to fight the enemy not to kill women and
children. It did not fit their image of a warrior to be involved in such a tragedy. They were in
contrast to the one soldier who took the legalistic view that he was doing his job and it was bad
luck that civilians walked into an ambush which had been set according to the rules of
engagement. He did not believe the platoon was in the wrong and therefore he was not going to
talk about the incident. Further analysis of his stance and the regret of the other narrators is
beyond the scope of this research.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
CONCLUSION

The events described here show how the different lenses of politicians, official historians, and
the private memories of soldiers produce different stories about the same occurrence. My
research has collected the stories of individual soldiers, which brings into the discussion material
that adds extra detail to the official version of events, in some places conflicting with it, in
others telling it from a different perspective.

1

The testimony of the platoon is undoubtedly an

improvement on the silence in the Official History series. In my view, their testimony helps to
debunk any suggestion of an Australian ‘massacre’, ‘atrocity’, or ‘war crime’. My conclusion is
that oral history is often the only way we can come to grips with memory, but also the events upon
which the memory is based.
Australian military history privileges the ANZAC and digger legends. The brave ANZAC and
the larrikin digger were on the battlefield model soldiers who did not, for example, accidentally
shoot civilians. Atrocities, war crimes and the ‘collateral damage’ of civilian casualties remain
a source of controversy. Politicians, senior officers, and the RSL often pretend that atrocities do
2

not happen because they should not happen. Much the same goes for ‘collateral damage’. This
pretence leaves the Government, Army and ordinary soldiers vulnerable when evidence of civilian
casualties emerged, as they did in the aftermath of the allegations by Cairns.
The newly elected Liberal government in 1976 did the ordinary soldier no favours when it decided
to dismiss outright Cairns’ claims about civilian deaths in Vietnam. It was a Coalition
Government that committed troops to Vietnam and it was a Coalition government that was
defending the A rmy’s honour in 1976. Malcolm Fraser, a former Army minister, was now
Prime Minister.

It was a point of honour that these troops had behaved at the highest

standard. The Army too did its best to pretend that civilian casualties did not happen.
The Army identified for the media a successful ambush against the enemy outside the village Hoa
Long in July 1970 that vaguely fitted some facts, but the date, the numbers killed and the
number of graves were wrong. In hindsight it should have been dismissed immediately, but the
3

Minister claimed this was the incident that Cairns had identified. It should have been

1. Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 47.
2. Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 203, incidents that should not have taken place 205.
3. ‘How the Army saw the Hoa Long Raid’, The Age. Horner and Bou, Duty First, 220-1.
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obvious that this information did not mean that Cairns, the army, the veterans and the Vietnamese
who had spoken to Cairns were all talking about the same ambush, same bodies and the same
graves. Both the Department of Defence and the veterans, having found an ambush, felt that their
position was explained and their honour reaffirmed.
The Minister of Defence, Jim Killen, leapt to the defence of the Defence Force’s good name. Yet,
a possible inference from the Minister’s assertions was that accidentally killing civilians was
regarded on the same level as an atrocity. The Minister of Defence’s assertion that Australian
soldiers had never killed civilians suggests that he was either badly briefed or was in deep denial
about the realities of the Vietnam War. Killen’s comments most likely show that he was more
interested in upholding a legend rather than coming to terms with what had occurred on the
ground.
The Commanding Officer of the Battalion involved in the ambush that the Department of
Defence claimed as the incident referred to by Cairns, labelled Cairns as a purveyor of Communist
propaganda. Further Robert Hall, the author of the 8 RAR history Combat Battalion labelled the
incident as an invented crime.

4

The point seems to be missed that declaring that this type of

incident never occurred will backfire on the political and military establishment if it is proven later
that such incidents did happen. The Government seemed to be placing itself in a position that it
may not be able to be able retreat from at a later date.
The argument here is not that we should trust without reservation the testimony of soldiers. While
Joe recalled a great deal, he was happy to repeat rumour and hearsay. He claimed that the platoon
was tasked with the patrol because it was a punishment for misbehaviour that had attracted the
wrath of a higher authority.

Other narrators make a similar comment. Examination of the Task

Force Patrol Program however, suggests that the patrol allocations were distributed evenly
between companies.

5

Similarly; Joe was troubled by the myth of Vietcong being thrown out

of helicopters. Joe details the medical evacuation process and finishes with a fantasised ending
in which he incorrectly claims the RAAF disposed of the bodies at sea.

6

This is in conflict

with the Commander’s Diary. 7 The bodies were, in all probability, returned to their village.

4. Hall, Combat Battalion, 197, 198, 212-3. ‘How the Army saw the Hoa Long Raid’, The Age. ‘Massacre denied by Angry Diggers’,
The Australian. ‘Massacre denied’. ‘Commander denies massacre’, Illawarra Mercury. ‘Colonel: Cairns victim of propaganda’, The
Advertiser. ‘Dead Cong had rockets: Digger’, The Advertiser.
5. 1 ATF Rear Patrol Programme For The Period, 200800H Oct to 260800H Oct 67. Located on
https://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/bundled/RCDIG1029937.pdf last accessed on 31/12/13.
6. AWM 95-1-4-61 Oct 67, 1 ATF Commander’s Diary, serial 3107, 23 October 1967.
7. 1 ATF Commander’s Diary, serial 3107. Unidentified, interview by Ben Morris, name withheld, tape and transcript held by author,
date and location withheld.
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How did my interviewees recall the ambush? Most narrators did not comment on the
ambush, until I raised the issue. They were leaving out parts of their story, as they knew this
memory was particularly painful for me. The ambush was a family secret and it was not generally
discussed at reunions or platoon meetings. This incident had generated much pain and guilt. In
fact, only two narrators mentioned the ambush entirely of their own accord. One of the two was
not on the ambush patrol. It is possible that an interviewer who had not participated in the
operation would struggle to obtain any information at all from the soldiers. For, as another
narrator put it, ‘I thought very strongly about not talking about those sort of things to
anybody’.

8

It was clear that I was part of the ‘problem’ when it came to narrators avoiding certain
topics. I had to coax a response from those who were afraid of offending me or reopening old
wounds.

Ultimately, most remembered their role with a remarkable degree of clarity,

confirming the literature that suggests that traumatic events occupy a special place in an
individual’s memory.

9

Common themes of trauma and remorse emerged from the narrations.

In case of the

ambush, the veterans recalled with great pain and clarity which civilians they believed they were
responsible for killing. One narrator reported an ongoing struggle with nightmares that recalled
the moment he opened fire. Another recalled his horror at discovering that his rifle fired the shots
that killed two civilians. Another theme was a sense of betrayal. Some of the interviewees felt
that their superiors in the chain-of-command knew or should have known that these civilians were
likely to walk into the ambush that we had set.

10

Most narrators justified the action by claiming that they had acted in good faith following the law
and their orders. From their perspective, the rules were followed in establishing the ambush, and
it went terribly wrong. On the other hand, there was a lot of bitterness among the veterans,
directed in various directions.

Many of the narrators who took part in the ambush were

angry. A number stated that the system failed to support them and their mates over the public
disclosures on civilian deaths.

8. John Hindmarsh, interview by Ben Morris, tape and transcript held by author, Runaway Bay, 7/12/08.
9. Lynn Nadel and W. Jake Jacobs, ‘Traumatic Memory Is Special’, Current Directions in Psychological Science, vol. 7, no. 5, October
1998, 154-7.
10. Burstall, A Soldier Returns, 150-84. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, 96-106. The following references explain a free fire
zone.
Richard Bigwood and Andrew Bigwood We Were Reos Australian Infantry in Vietnam Xlibris Corporation
www.xlibris.com.au, USA, 2011, 107. Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, 134, 153, 196, 537.
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Yet, the narrations reveal a tension or something unresolved in the memories of the platoon
members. The majority of the platoon were critical of the machine gunner, who initiated the
ambush. This could be the transfer of anger, shame and guilt onto a scapegoat. These emotions
are clearly present in the narratives. 11
For the platoon, the ambush resulted in the ‘unintended’ or ‘accidental’ killing of civilians. At
another level, the question has to be asked what ‘unintended civilian casualties’ means. In
setting up night-time ambushes in the vicinity of villages and farmland, it must have been clear to
those higher up the chain of command that civilians would inevitably be killed. It almost goes
without saying that an important issue from the veteran’s perspective is distinguishing between
the deliberate killing of civilians or prisoners as distinct from ‘friendly fire’, or misspoken
or misunderstood orders, which obviously falls into a different category from ‘atrocities’. In my
research it has become obvious that my platoon was not the only group of Australian soldiers
that had killed civilians. O’Brien’s history of Seventh Battalion, for example, relates two such
incidents. 12

The intention was to kill enemy, but it was accepted that this might involve the

killing of civilians as well.
It was interesting to me that my narrators often struggled to remember the 1976 media discussion
of the ambush even though they remembered the ambush itself in vivid detail. All my narrators
were vague about how the platoon was identified during the media frenzy that occurred after
Cairns made his claims on 2 August 1976. In stark contrast, their memories of the 23 October
1967 ambush were so clear. Although they knew that someone had appeared on the television to
talk about the ambush, no one was certain of that person’s identity, or it may be more correct that
no one wanted to remember. At the time of the ABC interview, nearly a decade had passed since
the platoon was in Vietnam. The Vietnam War itself was over and the veterans would have
to live with having fought in a lost and ultimately unpopular war.

It may have been that the media discussion was so unwelcome and so at odds with the ANZAC
legend that it had not stuck in the veterans’ memories. It is possible that the veteran’s need to
incorporate their private memory into public memory puts them into psychological turmoil.
This may explain some of the problems that have been found with veteran’s memory. 13 My own
memory of this event was clearly flawed. I had long believed that a question was asked in

11. John Polkinghorne, interview by Ben Morris, tape and transcript held by author, Darwin, 9/06/08, His comments given in
Unidentified ‘Deaths of 4 Vietnamese an Accident’ The Examiner, Launceston, 10 August 1976, 2. Unidentified, ‘Our Men Killed
Civilians’, The Advertiser. Unidentified, ‘Australians Kill 4 unarmed’, Western Australian News, Perth, 10 August 1976, 22.
Unidentified, ‘Civilians Killed by Troops’, Courier Mail.
12. O’Brien, Conscripts and Regulars, 77-8, 130.
13. Thomson, ‘ANZAC Memories’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader Second Edition, 244-7.
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Parliament about the ambush but a check of Hansard revealed no such question. None of the
platoon welcomed the airing of the incident in the national media.
Finally, in my research, my narrators are both remembering events, and at the same time narrating
their own version of history.

Their narration conveyed the emotional and psychological aspects

that Portelli has indicated as an important aspect of oral history.

The 'truth' of events is

important, not only to historians, but also to veterans. It is a most distressing experience to have
one’s memory declared to be incorrect by the ‘higher ranks’ or official historians. At the same
time, my narrators’ memories sometimes reflected a need to conform to the national legend, and a
desire to minimize their trauma. These traumas are ongoing as evidenced by claims and counterclaims about civilian deaths at the hands of Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. The thesis confirms
that the truth of these matters can only be found when the soldiers’ testimony is both tested and
incorporated into the narrative offered by the army establishment.
The platoon members who offered a narration were most concerned with relating what to them
is the correct record. The historian has to separate the facts from the psychological issues that
are interwoven into their memories and perceptions of the past. When relating events

to

which they were not eyewitnesses, narrators tended to try to construct a conventional
narrative to lend a sense of completion to their story. There is a need for the interviewer to be able
to discern if a narrator was an eyewitness or if a narrator is talking about an event as though they
were a witness when they are not. While the soldiers’ testimony was clearly unreliable about
matters about which they had no first-hand knowledge, it was remarkably consistent about
the events in which they had participated. Eyewitnesses’ collective memories of the ambush
represent an indispensable primary source for the historian to work with. The dialogue that occurs
in the taking of a narrative can add greatly to the information available in the written records.
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF NARRATORS

Brief details about each of the narrators
Name

Interview

Rank:

Location
1

ADAMS Victor

Canberra

Date

Place of Birth

Birth:
(Temporary)

03/01/1946

Captain

Joseph

of

Service
Dates

Coffs

Harbour

NSW

2 RAR
19/05/1967
13/06/1968

2

BATTAGLIN,

Perth

Private National

12/11/1945

ITALY

Serviceman

Renzo Antonio

2 RAR
08/05/1967
13/06/1968

3

CARTER,

Sans Souci

Private

05/03/1947

Sydney NSW

1 ARU
16/04/1969

Trevor Ernest

05/05/1969
5 RAR
06/05/1969
05/03/1970

4

CLEMENTS,

Whalan

Private National

13/10/1945

Maitland NSW

Serviceman

Kenneth Noel

2 RAR
08/05/1967
26/03/1968

5

CORSE, Barry

Perth

2nd Lieutenant

06/05/1943

Perth WA

2 RAR
19/05/1967
06/06/1968
1 ATF
07/06/1968
22/10/1968

6.

CRELLIN,

Mildura

Neville John

Private National

05/09/1945

Subiaco WA

Serviceman

2 RAR
19/05/1967
26/03/1968

7.

CROSS, Richard Humpty Doo

Private

24/05/1947

Subiaco WA

1 ARU
30/06/1967

Phillip

15/08/1967
2 RAR
16/08/1967
13/06/1968

96

8.

Winmalee

DINNEEN,

Captain

23/01/1940

Brisbane QLD

2 RAR
06/05/1967

Terence Edward

18/10/1967
1 ATF
19/10/1967
02/04/1968

9

ECCLES, Barry Mildura

Private

29/06/1947

Waikerie SA

1 ARU
11/06/1966

Thomas

16/07/1966
5 RAR
17/07/1966
12/05/1967

10

FORSHEY,

Gympie

Private

10/06/1944

Ipswich QLD

2 RAR
19/05/1967

Robert Leslie

14/05/1968

11

Minden

GORDON,

Private National

02/10/1945

Moree NSW

Serviceman

Brian Donald

2 RAR
9/05/1967
26/03/1968

12

GRABOWSKI,

Tin Can Bay

Corporal

04/08/1934

Germany

2 RAR
19/05/1967

Heinz

14/05/1968

13

GRAHAM, John Falconbridge

2nd Lieutenant

15/08/1939

Anthony

Paddington

1 ARU

NSW

19/04/1966
02/04/1967

14

HEATH,

Brian

Banksia Beach

Lance Corporal

29/05/1945

North

Adelaide

SA

Kingsley

2 RAR
19/05/1967
13/06/1968

15

HINDMARSH,

Runaway Bay

Private National
Serviceman

John Stephen

16/07/1945

Gladstone QLD

2 RAR
19/05/1967
26/03/1968

16

HIMONA Ross

Bungendore

Lieutenant

2 RAR V1
13/05/1967
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13/05/1967
13/11/1967

17

HORNE,

Ross

Lugarno

James

18

JENKIN, Victor Charters
Towers

Cecil

Lance Corporal

14/05/1945

Brisbane QLD

2 RAR

National

19/05/1967

Serviceman

26/03/1968

Private National

15/08/1945

Cloncurry QLD

Serviceman

2 RAR
19/05/1967
26/03/1968

19

KING,

Paul Nudgee

Private National

24/02/1945

Gympie QLD

Serviceman

Thomas

2 RAR
19/05/1967
18/12/1967

20

KINSELLA,

Perth

2nd Lieutenant

14/06/1945

Subiaco WA

2 RAR

Michael Vincent

National

19/05/1967

Stephen

Serviceman

31/10/1967
1 ARU
01/11/1967
06/12/1967

21

LANGFORD,

Narrabundah

(Temporary)

Peter John

ACT

Captain

26/08/1943

Wyalkatchem

1 ARU

WA

22/04/1967
23/06/1967
7 RAR
24/06/1967
01/07/1967
1 ARU
02/07/1967
09/09/1967
2 RAR
10/09/1967
14/05/1968

22

LANGHAM,

Townsville

James Edward

Sergeant/

21/05/1936

Penrith NSW

2 RAR

Warrant Officer

08/05/1967

Class 2

02/04/1968
2nd Tour
2 RAR
28/05/1970
01/06/1971

23

MCKENDRY,
Colin James

Rockhampton

Private National
Serviceman

05/09/1945

Emerald QLD

2 RAR
19/05/1967
21/05/1968
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24

METCALF,

Rukenvale

Corporal

10/09/1942

Sydney NSW

2 RAR
07/05/1967

Warren John

13/06/1968

25

MOON, Graham Poland

(Temporary)

James

Captain

11/06/1939

Ballarat VIC

1 Fd Sqn
08/10/1966
17/08/1967

26

NEWELL,

Buderim

Private National

24/12/1945

Serviceman

Norman John

Wollongong

2 RAR

NSW

19/05/1967
26/03/1968

27

POLKINGHORNE,

Darwin

John Kevin

Private National

08/07/1945

Adelaide SA

Serviceman

2 RAR
19/05/1967
21/05/1968

28

ROBERTS,

Roma

Private National

26/02/1945

Townsville QLD

Serviceman

Donald Martin

2 RAR
19/05/1967
06/05/1968

29

SYKES John

Canberra

Captain

28/07/1944

Geraldton WA

7 RAR
16/02/1970
04/03/1971

30

THOMPSON,

Weetangera

Captain

28/12/1943

Canberra ACT

7 RAR
02/04/1967

Vince

29/10/1967
! ATF
30/10/1967
26/03/1968

33

WARD

Canberra

civilian

Armidale NSW

nil

Geelong VIC

2 RAR

Elizabeth
34

WALKER Keith Beerwah

Medic

04/10/1947

19/05/1967

Robert

13/06/1968

34

Name Withheld

Wollongong

2nd Lieutenant
National
Serviceman
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withheld

Names NOT to

1968 -

be used.

1969

APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE

Questions:

Please give your regimental number, full name and date of birth!
Call Up! National service
Where were you recruited from? Where were you when you were called up?
You got a letter telling you to report to where?
Do you remember what happened when you got there?
There are three options at this stage:
1. Recruitment Regular Soldier
2. National Serviceman , or
3. Officer.
Option 1 Recruitment Regular Soldier
Where did you enlist?
Where did you do your recruit training? If a regular, and didn’t do your
recruit training at Kapooka, Why?
Where did you start your regimental corps training? If a regular, and
didn’t do your their corps training at Ingleburn, Why?
Anything interesting come out of this period of time?
What were you doing for the bulk of your time at Corps training?
What about drill?
Option 2 Recruit and Training Battalion- National Serviceman
Do you remember what happened when you got to Singleton?
Where did you do your recruit training? ... Your corps training? Do you remember which
company you were in for recruit training? Who was the company commander? Do you
remember anything about any of the instructors who were there? Who was the platoon
commander? ... The platoon sergeant?
After recruit training, what company did you join, and what training occurred?
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What about the training that the training manuals don’t cover? Who was the principal
person that guided your initial military education? How to starch your greens?
Did any of the recruits with you in recruit training serve with you elsewhere?
What training did you receive in corps training?
What about infantry minor tactics?
Were you in Singleton, in 1966? What time of the year? What was the weather like?
Who were the platoon staff there?
Do you remember any of the blokes you did corps training with?
Any of them turn up in your battalion? Who were they?
Where did you go when you left Singleton?
Option 3 Officers
Where did you do your training?
What stood out in this period?
What was your journey from your initial training to your battalion?
Arrival in your Battalion
How did you travel from Singleton to battalion base?
Where did you go initially, what company?
What was it like in those days?
Do you remember who the company officers and NCOs were when you arrived?
When you got to your battalion’s Australian base, what state was the battalion in?
Who was in the company at that stage?
What type of training did you do when you arrived at your battalion?
Do you remember any of the training you did while you were there?
Training Exercises
Exercise Barrawinga
What exercises did you do as a battalion?
If so, what do you remember about Exercise Burrawinga?
What medical problems did you strike at Burrawinga?
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Do you remember any of the other units that were there?
After you’ve done Burrawinga, what happened?
Canungra
Do you remember anything about Canungra?
Do you remember the obstacle course?
Exercise Get Set
Do you remember Exercise Get Set?
Pre-embarkation leave
Where did you go for pre-embarkation leave?
After pre-embarkation leave what happened then?
What happened over the leave period in November, December, and January?
Was there an offer made to the people who did not want to go to Vietnam? When was this
done?
Did anyone take up the offer? When was it made and by whom?
What happened straight after the parade, do you remember?
How long after the offer was made occurred, did you get the official warning that you were
going on war service?
Departure to Vietnam
What were you taught in the battalion to prepare for Vietnam?
Departure from Australia
When did you leave Battalion’s Australian base?
Did you have anyone there to farewell you?
What way did you go to Vietnam?
Advance party
What means of transport moved you to Vietnam?
Arriving at Vung Tau what was your initial reaction? So what did the
advance party do once you got to Nui Dat? Did you do patrols?
What activities were you involved in during this period?
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Ship
What was it like getting on the Sydney?
What was the mood like on the boat after you pulled away from the
wharf?
What do you think the thoughts really were? Where were you by nightfall
that day?
What about alcohol?
Anything else come out of that trip? Do you remember what happened on
the Sydney?
Reinforcement
How did you move from Australia to the battlefield?
How long did you spend in 1 ARU?
What training occurred there?
What was the daily routine?
When were you transferred to a battalion?
What was your reception in the battalion?
Arrival in Vietnam
Can you describe the smells of Vietnam?
What type of routine did you fall into when you got there?
What did you do on arrival?
What infrastructure was available?
When did you start TAOR patrols? What type of formations? How long did you stay in Nui
Dat?
Horseshoe
When did you move to the Horseshoe? What are your memories of Horseshoe?
What were you doing most of the time?
What are your memories of the minefield?
What were your duties?
Can you remember on your patrols any incidents, any contacts, anything that happened?
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When you came back to Nui Dat, can you remember what happened then?
Daily Routine
What was the daily routine? What were were your duties?
Which company/platoon/section were you in?
What were your duties?
Operations
Patrolling, what do you remember about patrolling? Were there any incidences?
How was the gear to be carried allocated?
What do you reckon the weight was that you were carrying?
Did you carry any claymores?
What about contacts?
Do you remember the dust-offs?
Do you remember anything else about the patrolling phase?
Did you move in platoon headquarters or a section team?
Did you help with the navigation of the platoon; do you remember what else was going on
concurrently?
Does any part of your company get lost? If so, what aids where used to find you?
Do you remember any long marches in or into any particular area; do you remember the
march in?
During your training you learnt the basic contact drill; did you use these drills in Vietnam?
Where you forward scout at any stage?
Did you serve in platoon/company/battalion headquarters at any time?
Ambush
Was there any difference between what you were taught in theory about ambushes in 3TB,
2RAR, Canungra and Vietnam?
What were the differences about ambushes in Vietnam?
Can you remember some of the places where you did ambushes?
Did you have a rear protection area when you were in an ambush?
River crossings
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Do you remember anything about the river crossings?
How did you cross the rivers? What other incidents do you remember?
Accidents
Were you involved in accidents or friendly fire incidents? Do you remember how many days
prior to the incident you went out in the bush?
How was the mood and morale of the platoon?
Did they happen in the Task Force base area?
What do you remember about that?
Were they covered up?
Animals
Do you remember any incidents involving wild animals?
Can you remember the platoon standing-to on any animals, because of animal movement?
What do you remember about the animals?
Do you ever remember standing to on the flock of monkeys? What about the noise, what did
it sound like?
What about other animals?
Range Practices
Do you remember any incidents while range practices were being conducted?
Do you remember firing Claymores on that range?
How was that normally done?
Administration
Tell me about daily routine, life in the lines?
Did you parade and what happened on this parade.
Can you remember things like medical parades, short arm inspections?
How were the anti-malaria tablets administered? How often did they happen?
What about other medical things?
Did you do any health inspections?
What were they conducted for?
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Did you have a problem with water? Were you taught about water?
Did your clothing fall apart?
What happened on the mess duties?
Discipline
Do you remember people being charged during your period in Vietnam? Have you got any
idea what they were charged for?
Were there periods when the charges were up or the charges were down? Did different
platoon commanders and different sergeants have different ways of dealing with the charge
problem?
Rest in Base
Do you remember parties in the lines?
If you got kicked out of the tent where did you go then?
Do you remember anything else that went on in the base lines?
What was the atmosphere in the boozer when you got there? What happened when you got
tossed out afterwards when it was closed?
Who were the characters in the bar?
What about entertainment? Besides the bar was there anything else?
What about visiting other companies?
What about the canteen?
Rest
Beach Parties R&R R& C
R&R Rest and Recreation done out of country—R&C done in country
Troops were supposed to receive an R & C break about a three or four day period off. They
were granted one R&R which was a seven day break. Then they had occasional beach
parties where they went down on the truck to Vung Tau for a day.
Beach parties
Can you describe the trips to Vung Tau?
Do you remember the Peter Badcoe Club, the Grand or the Annex?
Did you go on beach parties?
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Did you go drinking with the Koreans?
Where there any difficulties in getting the group together after a beach party? Was anyone
ever left behind?
R&C?
What do you remember about that R & C?
Other breaks
Did you go to Saigon?
Did you do an escort job? Did you visit the blokes that had got wounded?
Did you visit any other units at night time when you were back in Nui Dat?
R&R
Did you go on R&R? Where? Did you come back healthy?
Did you think you were mentally tough in Vietnam?
War End
So what happened when, the war was over?
Did you receive any medical treatment before leaving the Army?
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APPENDIX 3: PATROL COMMANDERS REPORT
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APPENDIX 4: STATUTORY DECLARATION BY BARRY CORSE
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